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This thesis analyzes Books III and IV of Xenophon’s Memorabilia. The 
Memorabilia is Xenophon’s defense of Socrates or the philosophic life against Athens or 
the political community as such. In Book III, Xenophon presents six portraits of 
ambitious young men. These portraits, read closely, unveil the psychological nature of 
ambition and convey important lessons about the Socratic understanding of healthy 
politics, as a realm that is necessarily pious. Book IV’s four Socratic conversations with a 
dim-witted youth named Euthydemus both underscore the lessons of Book III and 
explore piety itself, as a phenomenon that is necessarily political. These sections of the 
Memorabilia may thus be read as an argument for the necessity of a fissure between 
healthy politics and philosophy – and as a bridge from the one to the other. 
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For the modern West, the relationship between religion and politics has become 
practically and theoretically problematic.1 Liberalism itself, with its commitments to 
pluralism and religious toleration, has come to seem a form of groundless faith.2 Modern 
liberals seek, with great angst and contortion, to accommodate religious outlooks that 
seek to eradicate modern liberalism.3 Icons of irreligion come to doubt the possibility of a 
society not grounded in faith.4 
To obtain a new perspective on this problem coeval with man, we must turn to an 
old perspective. The understanding of the Ancient Greeks, foreign to that of 
Enlightenment modernity, may solve or at least clarify our puzzles. We turn to Socrates 
as the apparent founder of political philosophy.5 For frankness regarding the problem of 
                                                
1 Cf. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. 
2 Owen, Judd. Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism pg. 2-5, pg. 142-146. 
3 Cf. Qutb, Sayyid. Ma'alim fi al-Tariq. 
4 Cf. Rorty & Vattimo. The Future of Religion. 
5 Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History pg. 120. 
 2 
religion and politics, we turn not to Plato but to Xenophon, given that Plato himself may 
have been engaged in the construction of a new religion.6 Through the depiction of 
Socratic conversations with seven ambitious young men in Books III and IV of his 
Memorabilia, Xenophon clarifies the essential and enduring necessities of politics, 


















                                                






Chapter 2: Book III 
 
The Memorabilia is Xenophon’s defense of Socrates or the philosophic life against 
Athens or the political community. Athens, of course, executed Socrates for not believing 
in the gods of the city and for corrupting the young. The Memorabilia as a whole, then, is 
implicitly concerned with political life and religion. But the former is not explicitly 
investigated until Book III, nor the latter until Book IV. Books I and II defend Socrates 
against the charges on which he was executed (I.1-I.2), and then show how he – far from 
being unjust – was in fact a constant benefactor of his companions (I.3-II.1), family 
members (II.2), and friends or comrades (II.3-II.10). But with Book III, we turn to 
politics. 
Xenophon begins Book III with a promise to describe the fact that Socrates 
“benefited those who yearned for noble things by making them attentive to/careful about 
what they yearned for” (III.1.1). Book III as a whole contains fourteen chapters: seven 
chapters on political ambition; one chapter on what is noble and what is good; one 
chapter on courage, wisdom, madness, envy, leisure, and rule; one chapter on artists and 
artisans; one chapter on eros and philosophy; one chapter on bodily health; one chapter 
on indignation; and a final chapter on feasting. The first half of Book III depicts the 
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Socratic investigation into political ambition understood as a yearning for noble things. 



























The Initial Socratic Perspective on Rule (3.1) 
 
Chapter One presents Socrates’ advice to a young man aspiring to the honor or office 
(τιµῆ) of general. Socrates castigates this companion for neglecting an education in the art 
from which he seeks honor; he persuades him to seek instruction in generalship from the 
sophist Dionysodorus. But upon the companion’s return, Socrates mocks him and 
criticizes the instruction he received. After a brief attempt to supplement the incomplete 
education, Socrates sends the companion back to the teacher he considers incompetent. 
Chapter One raises several crucial questions which will recur in different forms 
throughout Book III. The Socratic attitude toward politics, at least in this initial 




Throughout this first chapter, Socrates displays a lighthearted attitude toward 
ambition, and toward politics itself. The initial effort to send the young companion to 
Dionysodorus – if Plato’s presentation of Dionysodorus is to be trusted (cf. Euthydemus) 
– was itself an act of flippancy, especially given Socrates’ own evident competence as a 
teacher of aspiring generals. Why did Socrates not teach the youth himself? The decision 
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to send the youth back to Dionysodorus, after Dionysodorus had proven his inferiority as 
a teacher, is even stranger. Most striking of all, however, is the Socratic joke that, upon 
learning how to be a general, the youth already appears “more majestic” than before, and 
is in fact already a general (III.1.4). 
When joking, Socrates “was no less profitable to those who spent time with him 
than when he was serious” (IV.1.1, cf. I.3.8). Accordingly, this Socratic joke has a 
playful side but also several serious points. On the one hand, the statement is obviously 
absurd: being a general requires actually receiving the office of general and exercising its 
power. One does not earn the title of general simply by learning the art of generalship. On 
the other hand, the statement expands upon a common or universal intuition about 
generalship or rule, reflects the hopes of Socrates’ companion, and points to an important 
question about rule. 
Socrates claims that, just as one who understands medicine need not actually 
practice medicine to be a doctor, so the one who understands generalship is a general, 
with or without being elected to the office. This claim is rooted in the common or 
universal intuition that knowledge of generalship (or rule), as the virtue of a general, is 
essential to one’s deserving the name general (or ruler). But Socrates expands upon this 
intuition about the definition of a general: only knowledge matters. Election and, by 
implication, other forms of consent by the governed, as well as the rule of law itself, 
become, according to this line of thought, completely immaterial. In Chapter 10 of Book 
III, Socrates repeats and elaborates on this idea that knowledge alone provides a 
legitimate claim to rule (III.10.10-11). That elaboration, of course, is immediately 
followed by an objection regarding the dangers of tyranny. Socrates there counters 
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lamely with a discussion of the natural consequences of tyrannical imprudence (III.10.12-
13); he seems to remain staunchly convinced that rule, however lawless or non-
consensual – however tyrannical – is legitimized by understanding alone. Is this the 
ultimate Socratic position? We will see in Chapter Four of Book IV—a chapter in which 
Socrates defines the just as the lawful—that it is not. But the reasons behind the eventual 
re-embrace of law and consent (cf. IV.6.12) will be complex. 
Socrates’ joke also serves to illuminate, through exaggeration, the hopes of his 
young and ambitious companion. To understand the twofold hope implicit in Socrates’ 
parody, it will be useful to divide the motives for desiring virtue—especially for desiring 
ruling virtue, as displayed by the ambitious young men in Book III—into four categories. 
One might desire virtue: (i) simply to have the virtue, i.e. to be virtuous, (ii) to exercise 
the virtue, i.e. for the personal enjoyment of putting it into action, (iii) as a means, in 
order to benefit the city or other people, or (iv) as a means, in order to reap eventual 
benefits for oneself (e.g. honor and wealth). One might abbreviate these four motives to 
virtue as (i) having or being, (ii) exercising, (iii) benefiting, and (iv) self-benefiting. 
According to Socrates’ joke, the companion, simply by acquiring the art of 
generalship, already “appears more majestic” (III.1.4). Socrates here parodies the young 
man’s hope that he would, through the possession of virtue alone, experience a great 
change in his condition (motive one) – to such an extent that his newfound virtue would 
be immediately recognizable from his appearance alone. Great honor, then, would almost 
necessarily accrue to him. Socrates seems to parody the youth’s confidence that simply 
having virtue will be sufficient for accruing great rewards (motive four). 
 8 
The companion seems to have hoped also that virtue would be its own reward, or 
rather that possessing the virtue of generalship would be good in itself. And yet, to judge 
from his continuing efforts to seek office, one might be inclined to think that he viewed 
his newfound virtue not primarily as an end in itself, but as a means. Socrates says that 
the youth’s knowledge of generalship has not only made him more majestic but has 
already transformed him fully into a general (in the only meaningful sense of the word). 
By stressing the possession of the virtue alone, independent of its exercise, effects, or 
honors, Socrates seems to turn his companion’s attention more fully toward the first 
motive for virtue. In other words, by claiming that being a general requires only that one 
have the virtue of a general, even without exercising it, Socrates claims that merely 
having the virtue is good in itself, the only good (or aspect of generalship) worth 
mentioning. 
But this observation brings us to a troubling question. Socrates himself, given the 
knowledge he here displays, seems to possess the virtue of a general. And yet he does not 
exercise or even attempt to exercise that virtue (Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates 57-58). He 
seems to lack a sufficient motive to put his virtue into action, or to bring about its effects. 
“What is most important” in the various arts, Xenophon had earlier claimed, is 
whether the exercise of the art will be advantageous to the knower of the art (I.1.8). He 
had then listed three pairs of uncertain human beings; in the central pair, the skilled 
general was revealed to be uncertain “whether to lead the army is to his advantage; nor to 
the skilled statesman is it clear whether to preside over the city is to his advantage” 
(I.1.8). These things are only clear to the gods (I.1.8); “those who think there is nothing 
divine in matters of this sort” are crazy (I.1.9). 
 9 
Knowledge of the art of generalship (that is, the virtue of a general) then, must 
include knowledge of whether or not being a general is good. Yet Socrates, though he 
knows the art and has the virtue, seems to make no attempt to exercise it. Does this mean 
that the true knower of generalship answers the “most important” question, the question 
of whether being a general is good, in the negative? Would the same logic apply, more 
broadly, to ruling? But if knowledge is the only legitimate claim to rule, and knowledge 
of the ruling art necessarily includes the knowledge that ruling is unchoiceworthy, how 
will legitimate rule ever come into being? And what does it mean to say that only the 
gods know whether rule is choiceworthy or not, or that there is necessarily something 
divine involved in these questions? Perhaps this points merely to human beings’ 
vulnerability to chance and to the gods’ knowledge of the future, but perhaps it points to 
something more fundamental. We are left pondering, then, this basic question: Is ruling 




Secondly, the initial Socratic perspective on politics seems to be extremely realist, 
even amoral, when it comes to war. A general should be “fit to contrive…shrewd, both 
friendly and savage/cruel (ὠµός), both straightforward and devious, both fit to guard and 
thievish, lavish, rapacious, fond of giving, greedy” (III.1.6). This advice is echoed by the 
Socratic father of Cyrus7 in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus (I.6.27). The general, then, 
would seem to be above or outside of the law or code of justice of his city. Is the general 
or ruler a part of his own city, or does he somehow transcend it? Does Socrates consider 
                                                
7 Although the name Cambyses is never mentioned in that chapter; cf. Edu. Cyrus I.2.1. 
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the realm of international relations trans-moral? Is its only standard prudence? What is 




Thirdly, the initial Socratic perspective seems to involve a great deal of 
debunking. Socrates’ young companion was not taught how to distinguish good from bad 
soldiers. He wishes Socrates to examine this with him (III.1.10). Socrates immediately 
analogizes the soldiers’ love of honor to a gang of robbers’ love of money. Robbers take 
risks for money; soldiers take risks for praise. The analogy presents courage through an 
offensively reductionist and amoral lens; the love of honor is merely another form of the 
desire for gain. Because the ambitious ones, who love honor or praise, are “highly visible 
everywhere,” it will be easy to select them (III.1.10) and put them on the front lines. But 
this statement raises a further question: is not the young companion himself an ambitious 
lover of honor? We see then, how the art of rule might eventually turn upon itself. That 
is, through learning how to motivate or even to exploit, a ruler might come to wonder at 
his own motives, and to investigate whether he himself was merely an exploiter or in 
some sense also exploited. 
This characterization of honor as a payment thus points us back to the fourfold 
desire for the ruling virtue, and to the question of the goodness of rule. One might claim 
that simply possessing the ruling virtue is choiceworthy in its own right. But those who 
desire the ruling virtue also seem to desire a reward – at least the reward of office (τιµῆ), 
understood as an opportunity to put their virtue into action (motive two). Or is the 
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exercise of the ruling virtue itself a sacrifice? This would seem to be indicated by the 
great desire for honor (τιµῆ) as a recompense for the activity of rule (motive four). If 
having a ruler’s virtue and exercising the virtue of a ruler were good in themselves, why 
would honor be necessary? But if the exercise of the virtue were bad for the ruler, why 
would the office itself be seen as an honor and a reward?8 Citizens and leaders seem to 
see rule as, on the whole, both intrinsically appealing and as a noble service or sacrifice 
deserving of recompense in the form of honor. But can it be both? 
 
The Investigation into Ambition 
 
The Socratic investigation of ambition that follows in the next six chapters of the 
Memorabilia delves into whether, in what ways, or under what conditions ruling is good 
or bad for a ruler. Socrates’ ostensibly flippant, amoral, and debunking starting point is 
thus highly provisional. That perspective, the perspective of a detached philosophic 
observer of politics, raises far more questions than it answers, and must in fact be set 
aside in favor of a careful, attentive, and immersive inquiry into the actual thoughts and 
desires of ambitious men themselves. This inquiry takes place over the next six chapters, 






                                                






Rule as Self-Sacrifice (3.2) 
 
Chapter Two consists of Socrates’ “dialogue” with a recently elected general; the focus 
here shifts from possessing to exercising the virtue of a ruler. Socrates presents a series of 
questions, explanations, and exhortations regarding the virtue of a general and a king; the 
“interlocutor” remains speechless throughout. 
 In this chapter Socrates seems to present a model of rule as entirely self-
sacrificial. Xenophon summarizes the chapter in its final sentence: “by examining in this 
way what the virtue of a good leader is, he stripped away the rest but left the making of 
whomever he leads happy” (III.2.4). The general must attend, like a good shepherd, to his 
ewes. A king, likewise, is elected “not in order to attend to himself nobly,” but in order to 
furnish “the best possible life” to those whom he leads (III.2.3-4). Leadership is 
understood as public service, as noble self-sacrifice. 
 But upon closer examination, the picture becomes more complicated. For whom, 
exactly, is the sacrifice made? Whose interest does the ruler’s service serve? Does the 
ruler understand his activity as a sacrifice? The chapter proceeds dialectically and must 




The Character of Sacrificial Rule 
 
Socrates begins the chapter with a question. Why, he asks the general, did Homer 
call Agamemnon “shepherd of the people/the men (λαοί)”? According to Socrates’ 
explanation, Homer meant by this that Agamemnon was the shepherd of the soldiers. 
Didn’t Homer use this phrase, Socrates asks, “because, just as shepherds should attend to 
it that the ewes will be safe and have their provisions and that the purpose for which they 
are sustained will be achieved, so also the general must attend to it that the soldiers will 
be safe and have their provisions so that the purpose for which they go on campaign will 
be achieved? And they go on campaign so that through overpowering their enemies 
they’ll be happier.” (III.2.1). But this claim raises as many difficulties as it solves. First 
and most obviously, is it really true that leaders seek primarily to provide for the safety 
and happiness of their soldiers, as if they were fragile ewes? Or doesn’t a good leader 
primarily focus on—and doesn’t even the soldiers’ dignity consist in being directed 
toward—achieving “the purpose for which [the soldiers] are sustained,” namely winning 
the war? Mustn’t the leader afford safety and provisions to the soldiers only insofar as 
that is more useful than putting them at risk? Aren’t the soldiers, then, not like ewes but 
like the dogs that protect them?  
The general could have taken the opportunity here to correct Socrates’ 
interpretation of Homer: Agamemnon was called “shepherd of the people/the men” not 
because he protected and provided for the soldiers like needy ewes, but because he nobly 
protected the people of the city; they were the ewes who needed protection. Why did the 
general decline to make this correction? 
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Had the general reinterpreted Homer in this way, several problems would have 
emerged. If the people back home are the ewes, what place do the soldiers occupy? Are 
they like dogs, used by the leader (the shepherd) and the people (the ewes)? But this 
would be a grim picture. No general would like to think of himself as merely exploiting 
the soldiers for the people’s gain. This mentality is not only heartless but also presents a 
clear violation of justice: if the soldiers are supremely virtuous in their protective activity, 
then the more virtuous are being sacrificed for the sake of the less; the high are serving 
the low. But is it not a demand of justice that the best receive what is best? An additional 
problem is posed by the shepherd analogy itself. Do shepherds truly protect and provide 
for their flock for the sake of the ewes? Or is not the shepherd’s effort made, in the end, 
for the sake of fleece and lamb chops? In other words, is the leader in truth serving his 
own interest and only exploiting the people? Two of the final chapters of Book II had 
introduced the analogy of sheep and the dogs who protect them. Socrates’ associate Crito 
had explained why he employed the dogs that kept wolves away from his flocks: “For it 
profits me more to sustain them than not” (II.9.2). Is this the secret mentality of the 
leader? Does he seek his own gain, exploiting the soldiers (cf. Edu. Cyrus V.3.47) in 
order to protect the people, whom he fleeces? 
A sudden shift occurs after Socrates’ question in line one, which may also help to 
explain the general’s failure to answer and correct Socrates’ interpretation of Homer. In 
the same way that “shepherds should attend to it that the ewes will be safe and have their 
provisions and that the purpose for which they are sustained will be achieved, so also the 
general must attend to it that the soldiers will be safe and have their provisions so that the 
purpose for which they go on campaign will be achieved? And they go on campaign so 
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that through overpowering their enemies they’ll be happier.” (III.2.1). Suddenly Socrates 
describes the soldiers’ purpose in going on campaign. But is this purpose identical with 
“the purpose for which they are sustained”? Or is there not a fundamental tension 
between the purpose of the leader, who seeks mainly to win the war, and the purpose of 
his soldiers, who apparently see their involvement in the campaign as a means to their 
own happiness? The general, then, would seem to be fundamentally separate from, or 
above, the soldiers; and yet neither would he want to say that he does not care about their 
happiness. Certainly the soldiers themselves must be, in an important sense, dearest to the 
general’s heart. 
 Accordingly, the next section shifts abruptly to a fundamental harmony of interest 
between the general and his soldiers, and between a king and his subjects. The general 
contends well himself and also (καί) causes his soldiers to contend well. The king presides 
nobly over his own life and also (καί) causes happiness for his subjects. No tension of 
interest appears, at first glance. But there is perhaps a tension between the interest of the 
general and his soldiers, on the one hand, and the king and his subjects, on the other. In 
addition, the primary concern of the leader as leader is left unclear. Does he seek to serve 
only the interest of others, or does he seek their interest in conjunction with his own? 
Repeatedly, Socrates’ strange phrasing suggests that the virtue of a leader does not 
consist in taking care of his own virtue or happiness, but also in taking care of the virtue 
or happiness of others. In other words, Socrates renders it repeatedly ambiguous whether 
attending to his own virtue is extrinsic to (or even disallowed by) the virtue of a leader, or 
included in that virtue.  
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 The next section, despite promising an explanation, presents only a more 
confused jumble than before. The strange phrasing continues: “For indeed the king is 
elected not in order to attend to himself nobly, but also (καί) so that those who elected 
him will do well because of him” (III.2.3). Once again, the first and second clauses 
contradict each other, and implicitly equate self-sacrifice (by the ruler for the ruled) with 
a harmony of interest (between the ruler and the ruled). The ruler sacrifices; but somehow 
it is precisely in that sacrifice that his interest, along with that of the ruled, is served. The 
electors, then, seem to share the king’s jumbled mentality. Precisely in his self-forgetting 
sacrifice, he hopes to serve his own interest. The virtue of a ruler, then, is: self-
sacrificially to serve his own interest. 
Next, Socrates claims that, “All go on campaign in order to have the best possible 
life, and for this purpose they elect generals, so that they will be their leaders for this” 
(III.2.3). “All,” presumably even the general himself, go on campaign out of self-interest, 
and for this purpose “they”—suddenly the general is not included—elect generals. “So 
the one who is general should furnish this to those who elected him general” (III.2.3)—
but apparently not to himself. Of course, if the best possible life is the most virtuous life, 
i.e. the life of rule, then the ruled, by definition, can never be furnished with the best 
possible life, no matter how noble their benefactor. Socrates calls it the “virtue of a good 
leader” to make others happy. But isn’t virtue a good, or even the greatest possession? If 
so, it would seem that the leader attains the best possible life for himself by becoming the 
greatest benefactor. But this would no longer be self-sacrificial. And how could he make 
others happy in the truest sense if true happiness means being the greatest benefactor, 
rather than the recipient of benefits from others? Alternatively, if the best possible life is 
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something that can be given to the ruled by a ruler, then it would seem that even as the 
ruler’s task became more coherent, his motivation for that task might wither. His true 
interest would lie not in benefiting but in becoming ruled by a benefactor. 
Socrates continues. To rule as a self-forgetting and self-sacrificial benefactor, who 
simultaneously serves his own interest, is noble: “in fact it’s not easy to find anything 
else more noble than this or more shameful than its opposite” (III.2.4). And yet the virtue 
of a good leader has come to light as, in a sense, its own opposite. 
The puzzle of the ruler’s own good has only intensified in this chapter. It would 
seem, according to this presentation, difficult or impossible for a human being to find 
choiceworthy a model of rule as purely self-sacrificial, as purely bad for himself. Even 


















Rule as Exploitation (3.3) 
 
In Chapter Three, Socrates converses with a young and recently elected cavalry 
commander. The man’s youth enables Socrates to ask, as he had not asked the general in 
the previous chapter, why he desired military office. Without waiting for a response, 
Socrates takes the time to rebut his own (and apparently ludicrous) suggestion that the 
youth’s ambition might stem from the desire for a different physical location as he rode 
his horse. In fact it is the bowmen who are thought deserving or worthy of this position 
(III.3.1). Their desert or worthiness to ride first presumably stems from the utility, for the 
war effort, of their occupying that position. The ambitious young man would seem to 
seek a different kind of worthiness, one not so strictly dependent on utility for the war 
effort. Or is it different? What is the connection between worthiness or justice, and 
utility? 
 Socrates then suggests and rebuts a second suggestion: neither did the young man 
seek military office for the sake of being recognized or perceived by others: “for 
madmen/those in a rage too are recognized by all” (III.3.1). It is possible that Socrates see 
a connection between madness and the love of honor; he seems here to point to 
something simpler. The desire for office or honor must be a desire for recognition of 
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one’s virtue. But this too raises a question. Which is more important to the cavalry 
commander: possessing virtue, or having it recognized? 
 The questions suggested by these initial remarks are quickly pushed aside, as 
Socrates suggests to the youth that his primary motive must be benefitting the city 
(motive three). Emphatically, the youth agrees. It is indeed noble, Socrates remarks – if 
the youth is able to benefit the city. Merely to possess and to exercise virtue is not noble. 
Only the successful use of virtue as a means to bring about actual benefits for the city is 
noble (motive three).9 This chapter would seem to abstract from every concern except the 
city’s benefit. 
 The youth is to rule over both horses and riders. He must attend to the horses 
himself, if the cavalry is to be of any benefit to him (III.3.4). Suddenly the focus shifts 
away from the city’s benefit and toward that of the commander himself. But after 
Socrates’ description of the potential deficiencies of horses, he shifts back to the youth’s 
ability to benefit the city. Only then does the youth respond that Socrates speaks nobly. 
The horses are to be used by the city. Socrates’ list of equine deficiencies, which 
are to be remedied by the cavalry commander, initially points to a harmony of interest 
between the horses and the army they serve. But gradually the focus shifts away from 
providing for the strength and the hunger of the horses, toward the training and ordering 
of the horses – now said to be naturally prone to rebellious kicking (III.3.4) – who must 
be prepared to take risks in a battle from which they will not benefit. The horses, then, are 
clearly exploited for the war effort. 
                                                
9 The same focus on the successful use of virtue will be implicit in Socrates’ advice to the 
younger Pericles (III.5.28). 
 20 
Socrates next turns to the horsemen. The youth must attempt to “make them 
better.” Better for whom? This question is neither answered nor explicitly raised. And 
yet, mirroring the movement of the discussion of the horses, there occurs the same subtle 
shift in beneficiary. At first, the horsemen are to be made more skilled in mounting their 
horses; in this way they, as individuals, will “more likely be saved” (III.3.5). Risk is 
mentioned, and yet the focus remains on training the men to be proficient, strong, and 
safe. But Socrates then suggests that the youth “sharpen the souls of the horsemen and 
arouse their anger against the enemy, things that make them more stouthearted” (III.3.7). 
Is this sharpening of soul still in the interest of the soldiers (Cf. III.9.4-7)? Is it 
advantageous to have one’s psyche molded by the dictates of a useful rage (ἐξοργίζειν)? 
Madmen too are recognized by all (III.3.1, cf. IV.6.10); yet no one desires to be a 
madman (µαίνοµαι).10 
Only here, after the horsemen have been made good and stouthearted, does the 
question of how to make them obey become pressing. Apparently the horsemen, at least, 
will find it in their interest to obey throughout the period of their training; they will 
consider their training to be self-improvement, i.e. to be good for them (motive one). But 
now, unless they are persuaded to obey, the horsemen will be of “no benefit”—
presumably to the cavalry commander, or to the city. The youth seeks Socrates’ advice: 
how can he make them obey? Socrates responds that, as the youth already knows, “in 
every matter human beings most want to obey those they believe to be best” (III.3.9). 
Once again the question must arise: best in what sense? Best for whom, or at what art? 
Presumably the art of generalship is at issue, and yet its character remains in question. 
                                                
10 Cf. Protagoras 350b and the origin of the word “berserk” in the Old Norse word berserkr. 
 21 
Does the best general, in seeking the army’s or the city’s good, seek what is best for his 
soldiers? 
Socrates here analogizes generalship or rule, by providing three examples of 
obedience to the one who possesses visible skill or knowledge. Sick people obey those 
whom they believe to be skilled physicians; those on a ship obey those whom they 
believe to be skilled pilots; in farming, certain unnamed people obey those whom they 
believe to be skilled in farming (III.3.9). The art of medicine obviously serves the 
advantage of the ruled, i.e. the patient. The art of piloting serves not only the ruled but the 
ruler as well; the pilot is in the same boat as his passengers. But does obedience to the 
knower of the art of farming serve the interest of the ruled, or merely that of the ruler? It 
would be very useful to know: Who is obeying? Other independent farmers, being trained 
to farm by themselves? Or the farmers’ own slaves?  
 Socrates here qualifies his earlier stridency in asserting that the virtue of rule 
consists in knowledge and knowledge alone. Here it is not merely knowledge, but visible 
knowledge – or perhaps “apparent” knowledge – that makes one a suitable ruler. Socrates 
leaves it ambiguous whether the ruler needs to appear and to be most knowledgeable, or 
merely to seem, and be believed, to be most knowledgeable. The youth, appropriately (cf. 
II.6.39, III.6.16), takes Socrates to mean that both knowledge and its appearance will be 
necessary. Socrates seems here to acknowledge, then, that in real politics his earlier 
principle – that knowledge is the virtue of a ruler – must be qualified to some extent by 
the ability to inspire consent, or at least confidence or admiration. 
 “If I am clearly the best among them,” asks the youth, “will this be enough for 
them to obey me?” (III.3.10). But according to Socrates, even this – even knowledge that 
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is visible and thus persuades to obedience – is not enough. The commander’s visible 
knowledge must be accompanied by the ability to “teach” the soldiers that obeying him is 
“both more noble and more conducive to their safety” (III.3.10, cf. Oeconomicus XI 8-
13). The soldiers must believe that the commander leads them both to what is exalted, 
virtuous, or even self-sacrificial, and, simultaneously, to what is prudent, cautious, and 
self-interested. The youth is appropriately confused; how can he teach this? Perhaps he 
also wonders if such activity is properly called teaching. “Much more easily, by Zeus,” 
Socrates replies, “than if you had to teach them that bad things are better and more 
profitable than good things.” But this new task is, in a way, equivalent to the previous 
task. To teach that the noble is the safe—if the noble involves courageously risking and 
even sacrificing one’s life in battle—is to teach that the bad is more profitable than the 
good. Or is it? In describing the “easier” task, Socrates adds a religious oath. The youth 
will teach the new lesson much more easily by Zeus, than he could teach the old and 
identical lesson. 
 The youth understands Socrates to be saying that the cavalry commander must 
employ the art of rhetoric. Socrates seems to concur and abruptly mentions law. Through 
reasoned speech we learned “all the things that we have learned are most noble according 
to law” (III.3.11). And yet there may also be other noble things, or at least one other (τι 
ἄλλο καλόν), learned through reasoned speech but not through law. “Those best at teaching 
use speech the most”; does this apply also to the gods (cf. Laws 859a with 861b)? Those 
with “the most understanding of the most serious things converse most nobly.” Socrates 
leaves unclear the character of the most serious things. Are they equivalent to the noble 
things? If so, which noble things – the noble things learned through the reasoned speech 
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of law, or through reasoned speech alone? We must also wonder why those speeches 
were not called noble, whereas this “conversation” regarding the most serious things is 
called noble. Socrates seems here to point to the possibility of philosophy as an extralegal 
endeavor which, at its highest level, involves not rhetoric but mutual dialogue (cf. 
Greater Hippias 286a-d).11 
 But abruptly, Socrates shifts again – this time, to a discussion of the chorus sent 
by Athens to a quadrennial religious festival on the sacred island of Delos. Socrates 
claims that if the youth had pondered either this chorus, or the speeches of the law, he 
would already have knowledge of the rhetoric successful cavalry commanders must 
employ. The members of the chorus sent to Delos, understanding themselves to be 
viewed by the gods—perhaps even seeing themselves from a divine perspective—
outmatch every other chorus. A self-consciousness filtered through the eyes of the gods 
seems to make possible this unprecedented abundance of good or manly men (εὐανδρία). 
The love of honor spurs the Athenians toward what is “noble and honored” (III.3.13); 
Socrates here differentiates the noble from the honored.  The horsemen would take risks 
if they thought they would obtain “praise and honor” (III.3.14); Socrates here 
differentiates praise from honor. It is divine honor, not human praise, that the risk-taking 
horsemen seek. If the young cavalry commander had pondered the effect of law, or the 
effect of religion, in creating a synthesis of nobility and self-interest, he would already 
understand how to lead. Socrates implies that courage, law, and religion are codependent 
or share a fundamentally similar outlook. An army works best when it borrows the 
outlook of law and religion. A divine self-consciousness is extremely helpful, if not 
                                                
11 Perhaps Socrates is making a gentle attempt to turn the youth toward this way of life. 
Xenophon himself was in the cavalry. 
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necessary, for one who must make the sacrifices necessary to healthy political life. 
Socrates implies that the society that is more religious will, ceteris paribus, always be 
more successful in war. 
 Socrates’ final advice to the youth summarizes the chapter’s model of rule: 
“Don’t hesitate, but try to turn your men toward the things from which you yourself will 
benefit, and also the other citizens through you” (III.3.15). Self-benefit, according to this 
mentality, comes first (motive four); benefiting the other citizens is a secondary concern, 
and may even be a kind of byproduct. Do “the other citizens” include the general’s own 
men? Or are the soldiers, despite the general’s affection for them, means to the happiness 
of others in the city? “But by Zeus,” the young man replies, “I shall try.” Apparently he 
has learned his lesson: that religion may be employed by a shrewd ruler in what might be 
seen as a fundamentally exploitative model of rule. The goal of Xenophon or his 
Socrates, of course, is not to suggest that such a model should be considered or adopted, 
but rather that it should be presented and thoroughly examined, as an unchoiceworthy yet 
eternal possibility. Accordingly, Socrates moves quickly into the presentation of a new 













Rule as Household Management (3.4) 
 
Chapter Four presents Socrates’ conversation with a battle-hardened soldier indignant at 
his fellow citizens’ failure to elect him general. He seems to display the sacrificial 
mindset described in Chapter Two. Proudly and immediately, he undresses and displays 
to Socrates his many battle scars, as evidence that he deserved to be elected. Worn down 
from his military service, he is particularly indignant at the Athenians not only because 
they failed to elect him but because in his place they elected a wealthy milksop, 
Antisthenes, who has never done anything admirable in the army. Socrates defends 
Antisthenes; he may become a fine general, given his love of victory and his ability to 
gather wealth and provide provisions. Just as he has sponsored choruses well, despite his 
inability to teach singing and dancing, he may carry off the victory in war without 
understanding battlefield courage firsthand. Unlike the cavalry commander in the 
previous chapter, Nicomachides vehemently denies – swearing by Zeus – any connection 
between leading a chorus and leading an army (III.4.3). 
In this chapter, Socrates ‘flattens’ military and political rule to the level of any 
other endeavor: “whatever someone presides over, if he knows what is needed and is able 
to procure it, he will be a good presiding officer, whether it is a chorus or a household or 
an army that he presides over” (III.4.6). Nicomachides is flabbergasted. He swears by 
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Zeus that he never thought he would hear Socrates say that good household managers 
would make good generals; he obviously spends very little time with Socrates. His 
astonishment would also seem to imply that Socrates has not only refrained from saying 
these things publicly, but has constructed the public persona of a respectful and 
conventional gentleman.  
But now he offers to join with Nicomachides in comparing the tasks of the 
household manager with those of the general. Ordering, punishing, and honoring belong 
to both types of rule. Yet Nicomachides repeatedly objects – three times in this chapter 
(III.4.4, 10, 11) – that the household manager knows nothing about the most important 
thing: fighting. How will Socrates answer this? He evades twice, then finally admits the 
truth: in his new model of rule as household management, the ruler seeks in the most 
profitable way to assign the fighting to others; he refrains from fighting whenever he 
finds this more profitable (III.4.11). But Nicomachides had meant that the general must 
fight himself. At the chapter’s conclusion, Socrates reiterates both his flattened 
conception of rule, according to which “attending to private affairs differs only in terms 
of multitude from attending to public ones” (III.4.12), and his earlier claim that the virtue 
of the ruler consists in understanding alone. 
 
Nicomachides’ Implicit Objections 
 
 The Chapter as a whole, then, presents a confrontation between the model of rule 
as self-sacrifice and the new Socratic model of rule as household management. 
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Nicomachides seems to have three separate but related objections to the way Socrates 
strips dignity or nobility from military or political rule.  
First, Nicomachides objects generally to the Socratic denial of any essential 
difference between public rule and other types of management. This denial implies that 
political rule is no more dignified or exalted than household management. 
Second, he objects to the Socratic characterization of rule as essentially self-
interested rather than noble. Antisthenes, loving victory yet cleverly keeping at a distance 
from the actual fighting, will gladly spend his wealth on “victory in contests of war—a 
victory with the whole city” (III.4.5). He will treat the army as a means to his own honor. 
Nicomachides would seem to despise such selfishness. And yet, he himself was 
unsatisfied with a purely self-sacrificial model of rule. To judge from his indignation, his 
own sacrifices for the city were made partly on the assumption that some reward, such as 
office or honor, would accrue to him personally.12 And yet he, at least, has displayed 
noble courage and sacrificed greatly, in a way that a household manager like Antisthenes 
never would. 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, Nicomachides would seem to object to 
something implicit in Socrates’ model of rule as household management: the separation 
of the ruler from the ruled. Nicomachides’ insistence that the general fight with his 
soldiers points to his understanding of a general as “one of the men,” who shares in their 
hardships and sacrifices. The dignity of rule lies precisely in its being rule over equals 
(Strauss 63). The model of household management, which implies that the ruled are 
beneath the manager, or even akin to slaves, strips dignity from rule. And yet 
                                                
12 Cf. Iliad IX 314-327. 
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Nicomachides himself had sought separation from, and elevation over, the ruled. He had 
felt, and still feels, great dissatisfaction with remaining “one of the men.” It makes him 
indignant to think he must continue simply to serve and sacrifice. Elective office is 
appealing precisely because it offers a kind of separation from his fellows. His own 
desires, then—without Socrates’ imposition—point to a great problem in the model of 
rule over equals, or the model of service to (betters or) equals. Not enough honor or 
reward, not enough separation or exaltation, result from such ruling, to satisfy the rulers. 
 
Rule as Separation 
 
And yet problems also plague a model according to which a ruler sees himself as 
separate from, or elevated above, the ruled. Why would such a ruler continue to serve? 
Such service might no longer be coherent; it might even be unjust. Can the high clear-
sightedly serve the low? Devotion would seem to be most coherent when directed toward 
a being or beings understood as more admirable and more worthy than the one who 
serves, not less. This seems to be one lesson of Socrates’ later encounter with the 
beautiful Theodote (cf. III.11.3, Strauss 87).13 If a ruler firmly understood himself to be 
more worthy than those whom he ruled, would not justice itself seem to demand that he 
seek primarily his own interest rather than serve theirs? And yet, from Nicomachides’ 
perspective, this would strip rule of its dignity, of its self-sacrificial nobility. In addition, 
it would open the door to exploitation of the ruled. Or, perhaps more radically – why 
would a ruler who understood himself to be separate from or elevated above the ruled 
                                                
13 And yet the gods themselves, though far more admirable and exalted than men, spend their 
time benefitting and serving them. 
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continue to rule at all? Not only service, but even rule itself might lose its appeal. Why 
would such a ruler any longer feel (i) a sense of obligation, to a community of which he 
was no longer fully a part, or (ii) the allure of receiving honor from those he understood 
to be less worthy than himself? Such a ruler might come to see rule not as household 
management, which already sounds like a chore, but as household servitude, as did 
Socrates’ companion Aristippus (II.1.8-9, cf. Edu. Cyrus I.6.7). 
It would seem, then, that a conception of rule according to which a ruler feels 
separated from, or exalted over, those whom he rules, presents us with a deeply 
problematic tension. Such a conception simultaneously (i) is essential to creating a desire 
to rule, and (ii) thought through, becomes destructive of the motive to rule nobly (or at 
all). How can a mentality of service and a mentality of rule coincide? 
The same problem, though in a different form, was implied in an earlier 
discussion between Socrates and his lighthearted companion Critobulus. The peak of 
Book II’s exploration of friendship, Chapter 6, had presented Critobulus’ anxiety 
regarding the possibility of friendship between virtuous men (II.6.16). Gentlemen, 
precisely because they crave honors, tend to fall into factious strife with each other as 
they compete for what is noble. Socrates, in response, had suggested an alliance of 
gentlemen, an aristocratic party, as “perhaps the solution to the political problem” 
(Strauss 51, emphasis mine). And yet a problem was lurking even there: in the discussion 
of the tenability of such an alliance, Socrates had mentioned that “it is far better to treat 
well the best who are fewer in number, than the worse who are more numerous, for the 
wicked require many more good deeds than the good” (III.6.27). The logic of aristocracy, 
then, with its lionization of virtue, leads not necessarily to a class of noble caretakers but 
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to a class that is callous toward the masses, or even tyrannically inhumane. The problem, 
to rephrase it slightly, is that those who might be inclined to rule – especially those who 
would make the best rulers – need honor and elevation as a lure to undertake the often 
difficult task of ruling. And yet that very elevation leads to a mindset by which rulers 
may find exploitation or repression of the ruled to be reasonable and just. The 
incoherence of serving one’s lessers may lead them to see rule as either an opportunity to 
exploit or as an undignified chore. 
 
The Haze of Rule 
 
According to the analysis of rule presented so far, it would seem necessary that a 
good ruler live in a kind of haze. He would need to view himself as both within his 
community and separate from it. If he were not within it, he could not be obligated or 
inclined to serve it; and if he were not separate from it, he would not feel the exalted 
allure of rule. He would need, also, to view himself as simultaneously below, equal to, 
and above those whom he ruled. If he were not below them, the obligation to (or 
coherence of) noble service would seem to evaporate. If he were not equal to them, 
something of the dignity of rule would be lost. If he were not above them, the necessary 
rewards of rule, the honors and the admiration, would be lacking. 
So what is the solution to this problem? Must a ruler simply maintain an 
incoherent conception of his own activity? Must he believe he is ruling over something 
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that is above him, in order to maintain both his nobility and its exaltedness?14 Can a 
concerned observer of politics depend upon the durability of that confusion? The political 
problem takes shape, in these chapters, in the form of the following question: How can 
one motivate the best, or the most capable of ruling, both to feel the need to serve, and, 
simultaneously, to feel the allure of rule as exalted and honored? The next chapter, 
















                                                
14 This confusion parallels that of the general in Chapter 2, who, as Socrates presented him, 







Rule as Mutual Erotic Devotion (3.5) 
 
Chapter Five is a dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles, son of the great 
Pericles. Here, Xenophon presents a model of rule as erotic devotion to the fatherland. 
The chapter may be divided into five parts. First, Pericles’ anxiety regarding the military 
future of Athens sparks an analysis of the current virtues of Athenian citizens (III.5.1-6). 
Second, Socrates and Pericles investigate methods of turning Athenian citizens toward 
their ancient virtue (7-14). Third, Pericles gives an account of the contemporary inversion 
of virtue (15-20). Fourth, Socrates equates virtue in generalship to knowledge and exhorts 
Pericles to learning (21-24). Finally come Socrates’ policy suggestion and exhortation to 
what is noble (25-28). 
 
Socrates’ Anti-Periclean Conservatism 
 
The chapter as a whole presents an implicit attack on the older Pericles and an 
explicit recommendation of a conservative or even reactionary politics. Periclean 
imperialism is attacked from the very first sentence. With the younger Pericles as general, 
Socrates hopes that Athens will “both be better at matters of war and have a better 
reputation regarding them, and that it will overpower its enemies” (III.5.1). A city’s being 
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better at matters of war, then, is not the same as its overpowering its enemies; the best 
policy may be defensive, even isolationist. Socrates then praises fear as conducive to 
order (III.5.5-6). He analogizes a city to a ship; terror at storms and enemies can make 
sailors more orderly and more easily ruled. This might suggest that Socrates favors a 
militaristic society, but not an imperialistic one. 
When the young Pericles asks how he might turn the citizens toward a renewed 
erotic passion for “their ancient virtue, fame, and happiness” (III.5.7), Socrates 
immediately suggests a much cooler, more level-headed perspective. The citizens should 
view virtue as wealth, as something profitable. The elder Pericles’ policy of stirring up 
erotic passion in the citizens (Cf. Thucydides II.43) is quickly rejected. Instead, Socrates 
spends much of the chapter urging Pericles to turn the citizens toward a reverence for 
their ancestors. 
Never does he consider praising, as the elder Pericles praised (Thuc. II.36), the 
contemporary over the ancient (Strauss 66). Only with hesitation does he praise even the 
more recent ancestors: those ancestors may be praised, if Pericles wishes. They are only 
“said to have far surpassed human beings of their time,” whereas the more ancient 
ancestors were “clearly the most excellent human beings of their time” (III.5.11, 10). 
Reverence for the ancestors prohibits any thought of surpassing them in virtue; only the 
Athenians’ contemporaries may be surpassed (III.5.14). When Pericles despairs at the 
disobedience of Athenian soldiers, Socrates reminds him of the nobility, lawfulness, 
grandeur, and justice of the judgments made by the Council of the Areopagus, an 
aristocratic institution weakened by Pericles the elder (Strauss 67). 
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But at the chapter’s end Socrates advises, surprisingly, an innovative policy of 
guerrilla warfare borrowed from barbarians (III.5.25-27). His recommended mentality of 
conservatism, then, is primarily for the sake of the ruled; the rulers themselves must not 
have the latitude of their prudence restricted by a hidebound reverence for tradition. 
Circumstances may demand even an unorthodox cosmopolitan borrowing of tactics that 
are certainly not virtuous in any conventional sense. Pericles calls these tactics not noble 
but useful (III.5.27); he seems amenable to implementing them. It seems that Socrates’ 
understanding has enabled him to become, behind the scenes, the true general, even 
though no one elected him (cf. III.1.4). 
Despite his innovative policy suggestion, Socrates’ overall political stance would 
seem to remain conservative or even reactionary. The popular mindset should be one of 
self-restraint and traditionalism. The citizens must be kept lawful and reverent; the 
orderliness of chorus members is twice praised (III.5.6, 18). Emulation of Sparta is 
recommended (III.5.14); the citizens must obey their leaders and strive always for virtue, 
especially physical or military virtue. But all of this, of course, raises a pressing question: 
What are the grounds for Socrates’ conservatism? When we consider Socrates’ own way 
of life, which is anything but traditional, and his praise of free-thinking inquiry as the 
peak of that life (IV.5.12, IV.6.1), his conservatism seems quite strange. Why would such 
a free thinker endorse a hidebound or even anti-philosophically reverent traditionalism? 





Confidence and Fear 
 
A closer look at Chapter Five reveals a strange ‘penduluming effect.’ Socrates 
seems to alternate between, on the one hand, a praise of confidence, self-assertiveness, 
and even self-exaltation, and, on the other hand, and a praise of fear, reverence, and 
humility. The praise of confidence begins with the central of five Athenian virtues listed 
by Socrates: the Athenians, he says approvingly, are more well-disposed (εὐµενής) toward 
themselves than their rivals the Boeotians (III.5.2). Reminding them of the noble deeds of 
their ancestors is useful in making them more exalted (µείζω) “and turning them toward 
attending to virtue” (III.5.3). Socrates seems to approve of a high self-estimation, not as a 
result of virtue but as its precondition, as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
But strangely, when Pericles explains that in fact the Athenians have lately lost 
their confidence and become very fearful, Socrates embraces this too: “I perceive that this 
is the case, but in my opinion the disposition of the city is now more acceptable to a good 
man who rules it. For confidence/boldness (θάρσος) implants neglect, easygoingness, and 
disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly” 
(III.5.5). Boldness is bad, and fear creates order. 
But immediately, Socrates pendulums back: the citizens must be persuaded that 
virtue already belongs to them (III.5.8). This form of confidence will make them attend to 
virtue. 
But they must simultaneously be convinced that they don’t yet fully possess 
virtue. They must strive to claim the virtue that is theirs, fearful of losing it. The 
ancestors were superior, and are to be humbly revered. 
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And yet, when Pericles brings up the gods, Socrates shifts the focus to demigods 
and ancient human heroes. This focus on demigods parallels the teaching that virtue is the 
Athenian patrimony, both nearby and slightly out of reach: instead of humility before the 
untouchable majesty of the wholly divine, Socrates suggests that the most magnificent 
virtue is, though not yet attained, attainable by human beings. His religious doctrine 
simultaneously encourages both reverence and boldness, preventing both the passivity or 
defeatism of groveling humility, and the laziness (or hubristic stupidity) of self-
satisfaction. The teaching regarding demigods and human heroes would seem to err on 
the side of implanting confidence in human beings. But Socrates immediately qualifies 
this, explaining the lack of virtue among Athenians as the result of confidence: “just as 
some others, who have become easygoing due to their great preeminence and mightiness, 
fall behind their adversaries, so the Athenians too neglected themselves when they had 
great preeminence and due to this became worse” (III.5.13). 
The question then arises: why is the balance between fear and confidence in a 
political community so difficult to maintain? Socrates himself, in the first half of this 
chapter, must pendulum a total of five times between the two goals. Confidence seems 
crucial to energizing the citizenry to pursue virtue; but that very confidence can itself 
easily destroy virtue through self-satisfaction. Virtue brings with it the self-consciousness 
of worth and the thought of reward. Perhaps, then, Socrates points to a problem within 
virtue itself. If virtue is noble or self-sacrificial,15 it seems to deserve a reward. But that 
reward, if it involves or consists in a cessation of sacrifice, means that one’s virtue is 
                                                
15 An implicit question arises here: is civic or political virtue necessarily self-sacrificial or self-
denying? And if so, why? This question will be addressed through Book IV’s investigation of 
piety and law. 
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destroyed. But is not virtue the greatest good? Is the reward then a punishment? But 
without a reward, how can one be motivated to strive for virtue? If virtue culminates in 
its own cessation or in a reward, virtue would seem mercenary, a mere means to self-
interest; this is not exalted enough to match our opinions about what virtue ought to be. 
But to say that virtue has no reward, and remains always an exalted end in itself — or, to 
say that virtue’s reward is simply the opportunity to exercise more virtue — seems too 
bleak and unsatisfying to match our hopes. Virtue unrewarded loses luster; virtue 
rewarded implodes. 
The dangers of confidence as a symptom of virtue might explain, to some extent, 
Socrates’ conservatism. Civic virtue might itself create feelings of worthiness and thus 
demands for a deserved cessation from striving. Virtue would then be discarded in the 
name of justice. A general unleashing and encouragement of innovation and self-interest 
would allow for this novel and self-interested neglect of virtue to proceed (Cf. Edu. Cyrus 
VIII.8). A reverent traditionalism, by providing role-models whose virtues could never 
quite be matched, would prevent overconfidence, neglect, and luxury. But this argument 
can only go so far. To understand more fully the grounds for Socratic conservatism, we 
must turn to the chapter’s central section. 
 
The Inversion of Virtue 
 
After Socrates’ praise of a piety based on reverence for demigods and human 
heroes, he recommends the emulation of Sparta. Here Pericles despairs. How will the 
Athenians ever mimic the Spartans, given that the Athenians now have contempt for their 
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own fathers? Pericles points to an astonishing feature of Athenian life during this time of 
strife and social dissolution: it is precisely the most honor-loving, those who, “as opinion 
has it, are distinguished among the citizens by their gentlemanliness (nobility and 
goodness)” who “are the most disobedient of all” (III.5.19). Upon hearing this 
suggestion, Socrates attempts to change the subject (III.5.20), and, after a brief protest 
from Pericles, succeeds (III.5.21). But the point has been made. If Pericles is right that 
those who had always displayed the most intense love of honor—a trait that Socrates 
himself had listed as a crucial civic virtue (III.5.3)—are now becoming the most 
disorderly or even the most vicious, then the question arises – why? 
 In Pericles’ account, the answer becomes clear: the honor-loving, as it seems, are 
viewing their own disobedience and immorality as virtue. The Athenians “not only 
themselves neglect good condition but even ridicule those who attend to it” (III.5.15). 
They “exult (ἀγάλλονται) in their contempt for their rulers” (III.5.16). While “using the 
common property as if it were foreign, they fight in turn over this and take most delight 
in their abilities/powers (δυνάµεσι) in such matters” (III.5.16). Contempt for the old and 
the lawful are becoming not merely acceptable but esteemed. In these times of severe 
social instability, when justice, law, and tradition are coming into question, it seems that 
virtue has reverted to what might be called a more natural form. Virtue has become the 
power, ability, and willingness to get what one wants (Cf. Thucydides, History of the 
Peloponnesian War II.53, III.82-84; Machiavelli, The Prince Chap. VIII; Rousseau, 
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Second Discourse: St. Martin’s Press pg. 128).16 Courage, the love of honor, and the love 
of virtue itself have turned against lawfulness.  
 And yet to call this type of virtue natural is misleading. The problem diagnosed 
by Pericles has to some extent, paradoxically, been created by law itself. Precisely 
because law has always been so highly revered by the citizens, it may come to seem 
mighty and glorious – especially to those whose love of honor is naturally strong and has 
been inflamed by society – to liberate themselves from and conquer Law itself. When 
lawfulness as a virtue becomes questionable, then, a society of robust and honor-loving 
souls tends toward something far worse than a reversion to natural virtue or an absence of 
law; it tends toward a reactionary and deliberate lawlessness. 
A healthy society, at least in Socrates’ portrait, must heighten both the reverence 
for law and the love of virtue, especially courage. But in such a context this very 
reverence for law creates, if not the seeds of its own destruction, at least an extreme 
fragility. It is the Socratic awareness of this fragility that explains Socratic conservatism. 
Through free inquiry, Socrates came to understand the character of something every 
healthy society in some way takes for granted: lawfulness. Any innovation in the basic 
norms or structure of a community threatens to spread and infect the rest. After a certain 
degree of reverence for the old and the lawful has withered, virtue as lawfulness may, not 
simply evaporate, but flip or invert into virtue as anti-lawfulness. 
 In a situation marked by such fragility, can lawfulness be saved at all? We will 
see in Chapter Three of Book Four that, and why, it can. Until then, we are left to 
wonder. 
                                                




Aristocracy and the Fatherland 
 
Socrates’ praise of the aristocratic Council of the Areopagus points us back to the 
unresolved problem of the relational character of rule. We encountered, in analyzing 
Chapter Four, the danger of aristocratic exploitation. The question there became: How 
can a ruler be made to consider himself to be both beneath the ruled, so that he might feel 
an obligation to serve them, and, simultaneously, above the ruled, so that he might feel 
honored and exalted in his task? Service requires honoring the object of devotion, and yet 
politics demands that the best serve. How could the ruler’s haze of relational ambiguity 
be resolved – in either direction – without dissolving either the motive to rule (i.e., one 
might come to see oneself a mere servant) or the motive to rule well (i.e., one might come 
to see oneself as deserving of the freedom to exploit)? 
 A closer look at Chapter Five reveals the answer. As the younger Pericles is 
informed of the virtues of Athenian citizens, Socrates finally introduces a crucial concept. 
The Athenians’ are honor-loving and affectionate, qualities which “spur one to take risks 
on behalf of both good reputation and fatherland” (III.5.3). What is the fatherland? It 
would seem to be a kind of transcendent abstraction of the city. The good citizen 
considers his own noble ancestors (and their traditions), his current compatriots, and his 
future descendants all to be a part of this larger whole. He fits within the structure of, and 
serves, this grander being. 
 The belated introduction of the fatherland clarifies how Pericles could 
simultaneously disdain his fellow citizens as immoral (III.5.15-17) and deeply desire to 
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serve them — just as Nicomachides, in the previous chapter, had felt an indignant 
contempt for the Athenians (partly because they refused to allow him to serve them as 
general), while that contempt in no way diminished his desire to serve. All of this is 
possible because, to a large extent, these men yearning for the noble things seem not to 
conceive of themselves as serving the people, but rather as serving the fatherland itself. 
The concept of the fatherland solves the relational problem of rule. A man may 
simultaneously rule and serve, because he feels himself to be erotically devoted to the 
fatherland, as are the other citizens – whom he rules. His service to them can, whenever 
necessary, be understood as an incidental byproduct of his service to the fatherland. He 
looks up to the fatherland and down upon them. 
 Yet pressing questions arise. First, what exactly is the fatherland? How is it 
perceived, and what role does it play in spurring ambition? And second, can even the 
fatherland resolve the difficulty of whether rule is good for the ruler? At the chapter’s 
end, Socrates exhorts the young general Pericles to heed his political and military advice. 
If Pericles achieves any of the things Socrates has advised, Socrates tells him, “it will be 
both noble for you and good for the city. While, if you are unable to accomplish some 
one of them, you will neither harm the city nor shame yourself” (III.5.28). His political 
involvement may be either noble or shameful for him; no mention is made of whether it 
will be good or harmful for him. Only the city’s good or harm is considered. The crucial 









Rule as Erotic Devotion to a Vision of Oneself (3.6) 
 
Chapter Six would seem to present an unexplained descent (Strauss 69). Leaving behind 
young Pericles’ self-forgetting devotion to the fatherland, we turn to Glaucon, whose 
wild ambition and unjustified pride have recently led him to make a fool of himself 
before the assembly. Socrates, who was well-intentioned toward Glaucon not for the sake 
of Glaucon but for the sake of Charmides and Plato, Socrates’ own friends, conversed 
with him in an attempt to make him more moderate. 
First, Socrates describes the objects of – and even inflames – Glaucon’s ambitious 
hopes, in order to get his full attention (Cf. Plato, Alcibiades 105a-e). Next, he asks 
Glaucon how he plans to benefit the city, as such benefiting will be necessary for 
attaining the great honor he seeks. After a banal interrogation regarding revenues and 
expenditures, war power, guard posts, silver mines, and agriculture, Glaucon – aware that 
he is “being made fun of” for his total neglect of the ruling art – momentarily turns 
against rule itself as “a huge task” (III.6.13). Socrates then takes the opportunity to 
compare rule to household management and to exhort Glaucon to ‘start small’ by helping 
his Uncle Charmides manage his own impoverished estate (cf. Xen. Symp. IV.29-33). 
Finally, Socrates exhorts Glaucon to seek knowledge of the art of rule as a means to 
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praise and admiration. Understanding is necessary but not sufficient for a good reputation 
(Cf. Strauss 71), while ignorance is necessary but not sufficient for a bad one (III.6.16). 
 
Glaucon Versus Pericles 
 
Glaucon is a much less impressive interlocutor than the young Pericles. Not only 
does he lack self-knowledge and moderation, but his ambitions are much more self-
interested. Pericles desired to rule in order to benefit the city or the fatherland (motive 
three); he showed great anxiety at the city’s deterioration. Glaucon, on the other hand, 
seems almost entirely motivated by the desire for personal honor (motive four). The city 
is a mere means to his own exaltation; its good is an afterthought: Socrates must remind 
him of it (III.6.3). Those who most desire to rule often give no thought, strangely, to the 
art or exercise of ruling itself. They seek not to gain a new virtue but to display and be 
rewarded for a virtue they feel confident they naturally and spontaneously possess (Cf. 
IV.2.6 and Plato’s Alcibiades 105b). Glaucon has been so focused on the great rewards of 
rule that he has ignored entirely the exercise of the ruling virtue; he thinks he can become 
famous without first learning how to rule. Socrates seeks to correct this, steering him 
toward the possession of virtue and away from its rewards. 
But if Glaucon is unimpressive or even ridiculous, the question then arises: Why 
descend from Pericles to Glaucon? What was wrong with the younger Pericles’ model of 
political involvement as selfless, mutual erotic devotion to the fatherland? What in 
Pericles’ own mentality necessitated the turn to, and investigation of, a character like 
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Glaucon? For the answer, we must turn back to the Memorabilia’s first mention of the 
fatherland, in Socrates’ dialogue with the half-Socratic hedonist Aristippus, in Book II. 
Aristippus, perhaps influenced by Socrates, had compared rule not merely to 
household management but to household slavery. Socrates had attempted to convince him 
that rule was in fact choiceworthy. First he praised willing suffering – seeming to admit 
that ruling is a self-sacrificial activity – as something that the sufferer can voluntarily 
end, and from which he can hope for rewards (II.1.18). But then he called “those sorts of 
rewards for one’s labors…of little worth.” Then came the true defense of rule as a 
choiceworthy endeavor: 
…what about those who labor so that they may acquire good friends or that they 
may subdue their enemies, or so that by becoming powerful in their bodies and souls 
they may manage their own house nobly and treat their friends well and do good 
deeds for their fatherland? Surely one should know that these both labor for such 
things with pleasure and take delight in living, since they admire themselves and are 
praised and emulated by others. (II.1.19) 
 
 
The motive to benefiting and serving the fatherland, at least in this initial presentation, 
would seem to lie in the desire for self-admiration and praise. Perhaps, then, the wild 
Glaucon is merely more transparent about motives the younger Pericles secretly shares? 
Perhaps even young Pericles, knowingly or unknowingly, hoped that erotic devotion to 
the fatherland would in fact be a means of self-exaltation. Perhaps even he understood 





If Glaucon might represent, with comic hypertrophy or comic openness, motives 
shared by every man devoted to the fatherland, we must investigate those motives. In a 
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crucial passage of Chapter Six, Socrates outlines what Glaucon hopes he will attain 
through presiding over the city. Apparently agreeing with Socrates’ characterization, 
Glaucon remains in Socrates’ presence “with pleasure.” An analysis of this list of hopes 
is essential to an understanding of the new model of rule presented (and, once again, 
contrasted with the Socratic model of household management) in this chapter. 
 Upon hearing of Glaucon’s plans to preside over their city, Socrates immediately 
swears by Zeus and calls this noble, “if indeed anything else among human beings is.” 
Presiding over the city is noble because (γάρ): 
 
it is clear that, should you accomplish this, you will be able to obtain for yourself 
whatever you desire and be competent to benefit your friends; you will raise up your 
paternal household; you will enlarge your fatherland; you will be famous, first in the 
city, then in Greece, and perhaps, like Themistocles, even among the barbarians. 
And wherever you are, you will be gazed at from all sides/admired. (III.6.2) 
 
 
Presiding over the city is noble first of all because it will make Glaucon omnipotent. 
Anything he desires will be his. Presumably this would include, if he happens to desire it, 
immortality. Socrates mentions the benefiting of friends, but the stress is on Glaucon’s 
own competence as a benefactor. He will enlarge his fatherland and become more and 
more famous, self-expansively, until his own reputation fills the world. He will become 
as enduring as Themistocles or Themistocles’ enduring name. Wherever he is – 
apparently even when alone – he will be gazed at or admired. Glaucon would seem, in all 
of this, to expect from his presiding a great change in his condition. When Socrates said 
all of this, “Glaucon was exalted/made great (ἐµεγαλύνετο) and remained with pleasure” 
(III.6.3). Perhaps, without realizing it, he was already experiencing the great reward of 
self-admiration for which he so fervently longed. 
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 A curious inversion of causality seems to have occurred in Glaucon’s mind. He 
has come to see honor, not merely as the effect of great virtue, but as its cause. Or, 
through close association, honor and virtue now seem interchangeable. If he can simply 
preside over the city, honor from all human beings will (announce or) lead to a change in 
his being, and thus to great rewards. The precise character of these great rewards is 
vague: does he simply expect, from his honor and thus virtue, to deserve further honor? 
This is left unclear. But it seems that Glaucon hopes, through his erotic devotion to the 
city, to obtain a status nearly divine. 
Glaucon considers the city a means to self-exaltation. Benefiting the city will lead 
to the honor he craves. Only as an afterthought, in the glow of exaltation, does he 
examine “just then where he would begin” in doing good deeds for the city. But the city, 
the act of benefiting the city, or the resultant honors – if they are to transform his very 
being – must be quite exalted things themselves.17 It is for this reason that, despite their 
differences, Glaucon’s vision of rule must share a key concept with Pericles’ vision. 
Pericles’ model of rule was one of mutual erotic devotion to the fatherland. Glaucon, far 
more blatantly self-interested, presents a model of rule as erotic devotion to an ideal of 
oneself as a god. Glaucon thus solves the problem of the ruler’s self-interest that plagued 
Pericles’ model of rule. Yet Glaucon too must lean upon a conception of the fatherland. If 
the city is so powerful as to be transformative, it must – though a means – be exalted. But 
the question has become only more pressing: What is the fatherland? 
 
                                                
17 Whether there is a tension in the very notion of an exalted means, especially an exalted means 
to one’s own self-interest, is a question that must be left unresolved. (Cf. Euthydemus on prayer 






Rule as Friendship (3.7) 
 
Chapter Seven presents a conversation with Charmides. No interlocutor in Book III—or 
in the Memorabilia as a whole—is so highly praised as Charmides. He was, Socrates 
perceived, “a remarkable (ἀξιόλογος) man and far more able than those engaged in 
political affairs at that time” (III.7.1). Charmides was a very close associate of Socrates; 
he doubted Socrates’ daimonion (Plato, Theages 128e) and saw Socrates dancing alone 
(Symp. II.19). He also possessed great natural virtue. Five times – in only the first half of 
this chapter – his great power or ability (δυνατός, δύναµις) is mentioned. He had the natural 
ability or prudence to advise political men nobly (III.7.3). Socrates advises him to 
exercise (motive two) the ruling virtue he already possesses. To exercise this virtue by 
engaging in politics will benefit Charmides’ fellow citizens and friends, and – not least – 
Charmides himself (III.7.9). By the end of this chapter, Socrates has solved the problem 
of the ruler’s good with a new model of rule, a model of rule as friendship. Yet to arrive 
at this new model, he must eliminate the awe or fear that prohibits Charmides’ entrance 
into politics. 
 
The Fatherland, The City, and The Demos 
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Charmides, despite his talents, is afraid of entering political life. From Socrates’ 
and Xenophon’s perspective, Charmides is hesitant to approach the demos (III.8.1). But 
when Socrates, in conversation with Charmides, analogizes that hesitation or fear to the 
hesitation of an admirable athlete, he speaks of the fatherland. Charmides responds that 
an athlete who failed to obtain honor “and enhance the reputation of his fatherland” 
would be “soft and cowardly.” Socrates, turning to political engagement, then speaks of 
the city (πόλις). If a naturally powerful man hesitated to enlarge his city – the city’s size, 
not its reputation, is mentioned – would he not plausibly be considered a coward? Here 
Charmides catches on and becomes reticent (III.7.2). Socratic analogies, this one 
included, often function to split the good from one’s own, which human beings naturally 
conflate. After allowing reason to function freely, uninhibited by defensiveness or 
complacency with current opinions, Socrates returns his interlocutor to the circumstances 
at hand (cf. Laws 638d-641a). With Charmides, he appeals to shame and necessity after 
abstracting from, and then returning to, the particular circumstances. Is Charmides not a 
coward for – despite his great talents – failing to engage in political affairs? 
 Charmides questions Socrates’ faith in his abilities. But Socrates has seen 
Charmides, behind the scenes, nobly advising the ‘real’ political men, just as we saw 
Socrates advising Pericles, or as Charmides saw Socrates dancing alone. Was the nobility 
of Charmides’ advice, in Socrates’ estimation, due primarily to the exercise of such great 
prudence, or to the good effects of that prudence for the city? 
 Having been convinced of his abilities or Socrates’ competence to judge them, 
Charmides argues against political engagement on the grounds that private abilities are 
different from public abilities. In private, one converses; in public, one competes for a 
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prize (ἀγωνίζεσθαι). But Socrates denies, as he denied to Nicomachides (III.4.12, cf. 
Strauss 63), any essential difference between private and public action. In any activity, 
only ability matters; the number of spectators, be they none or a multitude, counts for 
nothing. 
 Charmides counters: Does Socrates not understand that awe (αἰδώς) and fear are 
“naturally inborn (ἔµφυτα) in human beings and that they present themselves/come to 
stand near one (παριστάµενα) far more in crowds than in private company?” (III.7.5). If 
Charmides’ understanding of human nature is correct, human beings are naturally 
political animals, or very nearly so. Crowds, especially somewhat orderly crowds, can 
easily be perceived or even personified as a unity. Natural awe must merely be tethered to 
the political community or the fatherland, as a kind of deity, to whom respect and service 
must be paid (cf. especially Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. I, Part Two, 
Chapter 6). 
 But Socrates, in order to counteract Charmides’ hesitation to enter politics, picks 
apart this perspective on the city. Most clearsightedly, the city is viewed not as the 
fatherland, nor even, perhaps, as a unity, but as a collection of individual human beings: 
fullers, shoemakers, carpenters, smiths, farmers, merchants, those who barter in the agora 
(III.8.6). The city is not, according to this account, more exalted than its parts. 
Charmides’ shame or fear is irrational. Many in the city are senseless, weak, and easily 
overcome by men like the virtuous Charmides (III.7.5, 7.8). 
Socrates concludes with an exhortation to self-understanding (III.7.9). If 
Charmides came to understand himself, he would better understand the fatherland or the 
city, unlike the many (οἱ πολλοί). If he understood himself, he would still speak of awe and 
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fear as natural in human beings, but he would not speak of them as “presenting 
themselves to one/coming near one (παριστάµενα),” as if from outside. 
 
Rule as Friendship 
 
In his final exhortation, Socrates tells Charmides not to neglect the city’s affairs: 
“for when these things are going well, not only the other citizens but also your friends 
and, not least, you yourself will benefit” (III.7.9). This model of rule not only solves the 
problem of the ruler’s own good, but apparently solves the problem of exploitation – 
through the introduction of friendship. According to this model of rule, a ruler benefits 
from ruling through a non-exalted, clearsighted enjoyment of (i) living in a well-
functioning city, (ii) the exercise of his own virtue, (iii) the real – as opposed to vague, 
distant, and exalted – rewards of rule, such as honor (cf. II.1.18-19), and (iv) benefiting 
his friends. If a ruler’s feeling of friendship can extend to the entire city, 18 the problem of 
rule will be solved. If men are only friends with those who are like them (cf. II.6.20-22), 
and the rulers are, or must consider themselves to be, superior to the many, then the 
problem of rule will remain. An analysis of Charmides’ own political career may shed 
light upon this question (cf. Strauss 73). Though it came at the expense of religious 
reverence for the fatherland, Socrates would seem to have found a coherent and 




                                                
18 Perhaps the recognition of this problem was one reason Socrates agreed with the Greeks that 






Book III: Xenophon’s Typology of Rule 
 
Glancing back over Book III’s six portraits of political men, we find that Xenophon has 
systematized the essential, and universal, forms of political ambition; he has presented an 
exhaustive typology. Chapter Two presented a mentality of rule as self-sacrifice. Chapter 
Three presented a mentality of rule as exploitation, especially an exploitation which uses 
piety as a tool for instilling politically necessary virtues. Chapter Four presented – as 
contrasted to the ideal of self-sacrifice – the Socratic mentality of rule as household 
management, more chore-like than exalted. Chapters Five and Six presented erotic and 
exalted mentalities of rule: Periclean mutual erotic devotion to the fatherland, and 
Glauconian erotic devotion to an ideal of oneself. Finally, Chapter Seven presented a 
mentality of rule as friendship. The models presented in Chapters Two, Five, and Six 
seem to depend upon a ruler viewing his own activity as somehow exalted. The models 
presented in Chapters Two, Four, and Five involve a ruler viewing his own activity as 
primarily directed toward the good of someone or something else, as opposed to viewing 
his activity as self-interested. To risk a gimmick for the sake of clarity, we may 
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But a question must arise: Can this typology of ruling mentalities yet be 
considered complete or satisfactory? According to Socrates, those who think that there is 
nothing divine in the fundamental question of statesmanship are crazy (III.1.8-9). It is for 
that reason that the attractiveness or tenability of each model of rule can only be 






















 (invented by Socrates) 
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Three (or Four?) Natures of Young Men (4.1) 
 
Book IV consists of eight chapters: an introduction; a chapter about justice; a chapter 
about the gods; a chapter about the just as the lawful; a chapter about continence and the 
noble; a chapter about piety, law, and courage; a chapter about natural science; and a 
final chapter about the death of Socrates. Chapters Two, Three, Five, and Six present 
dialogues with an unpromising, beautiful, and ambitious youth named Euthydemus. 
 According to the first sentence of Book IV’s introductory chapter, young men 
were magnetically drawn to Socrates because he was visibly beneficial to his companions 
“in every matter and in every manner (πάντα τρόπον)” (IV.1.1). He was beneficial to 
different types in different manners (cf. IV.1.3). He fell in love, not with the physically 
beautiful, but with those possessing good natures, “whose souls were naturally well 
formed for virtue” (IV.1.2). These were the naturally quick-witted and intellectual types; 
they loved learning (µαθηµάτων) and were drawn to noble private lives. Through education 
(παιδευθέντας) – by Socrates? by the city? – these natures “would not only be happy 
themselves and nobly manage their own households but they would also be able to make 
other human beings as well as cities happy” (IV.1.2). 
 Socrates approached in a quite different manner a second type: the haughty ones. 
These types “thought they were by nature good” and “were contemptuous of learning.” 
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Socrates taught them that “the natures opinion holds as best are most in need of 
education,” analogizing them to high-spirited horses who must be broken in order to 
become useful and best (for their owners, or for the city) and aggressive dogs who must 
be nobly reared in order to become useful. Similarly (ὁµοίως), the best natures among 
human beings are “most robust in their souls” (IV.2.4) and capable of the greatest harms 
and the greatest benefits. 
 A final class, the money-lovers, Socrates simply insulted. These had little 
philosophic promise, having accepted so easily a wholly conventional measure of 
personal worth. Only insults – “simpleton,” “foolish” – could pry apart their conflation of 
the possession of money with the possession of honor, virtue, and happiness. But even 
these, therefore, would seem to have a deep concern for virtue, reputation, and nobility. 
The money-lovers seem to assume, as Glaucon did, that honor must be a symptom of 
underlying virtue – even if that honor is truly attained through ostentatious wealth alone. 
They seem to seek money as a means to honor, and honor as a means to virtue, dignity, 
and the confirmation of their own worth – a confirmation which may in turn promise 
even greater future rewards. Riches seem to suffice for them in accomplishing “whatever 
they wish” (IV.2.5). 
 
The Best Natures 
 
But upon closer examination, this clear-cut, three-fold typology of souls seems to 
become more ambiguous, more obscure, more complex. Is it really the case that the 
haughty natures described in section three are equivalent to the best natures described in 
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section four? The latter are called “similar,” as if merely being analogized to the horses 
and dogs in Socrates’ lecture to the haughty types. But this ostensible conflation is in fact 
misleading. They are called similar precisely because they are not the same. 
The haughty types only think they are by nature good; they are the natures opinion 
holds to be best (IV.1.3). But the natures described in section four are in fact “the best 
natures, who are most robust/powerful (ἐρρωµενεστάτους) in their souls and most able to 
accomplish (ἐξεργαστικωτάτους) whatever they attempt” (IV.2.4). These types possess 
natural virtue to a superlative degree. The haughty types, if they are not broken or nobly 
reared, may, like unbroken horses or dogs, “become mediocre/extremely common” 
(φαυλοτάτους) or useless. On the other hand, the truly best natures, without education and 
learning, “become worst and most harmful,” and “since they are grand and impetuous 
they are hard to restrain and hard to turn back, which is why the bad things they do are 
very many and very great” (IV.1.4). The haughty are at risk of mediocrity; the best are a 
risk to the world. The haughty natures, contemptuous of learning, must receive education 
(παιδείας). But the best natures must receive not merely education but “learning” – mentioned 
twice in this section (µαθόντας, ἀµαθεῖς). The difference between education and learning is 
left unclear. Socrates makes no mention of the useful, the noble, or the city’s benefit in 
the discussion of the truly best natures. 
 
The Haze of the Socratic Search 
 
So where are the best natures to be found? If they are, as they now appear to be, a 
special subset, do they emerge from among the haughty natures, or from among the 
good? 
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The ambiguity in this chapter might reflect a difficulty or haziness in Socrates’ 
search, or rather in the Socratic search, for the best natures themselves. If the very best 
natures were not merely a subset of the intellectual group, but rather combined the genius 
of the intellectual types with the haughty grandeur of the ambitious, they might, initially, 
be somewhat difficult to distinguish from the latter. If true, this would make Socratic 
political philosophy – understood here as the political effort of philosophy to coax the 
best natures away from politics and toward the philosophic life – doubly dubious, and 
doubly dangerous. At first glance, was the young Plato more akin to the intellectual 
Timaeus, or to the robust and ambitious Alcibiades? This chapter’s ambiguity, along with 
Alcibiades’ earlier dialectical debunking of his guardian (I.2.46), might shed light on 




















Chapter Two presents Socrates’ initial conversation with “the beautiful Euthydemus.” In 
the first of the chapter’s nine sections, Socrates lures this quietly ambitious young man 
into private conversation – first by gentle and tacit mockery (IV.2.2), then by severe 
public humiliation (IV.2.3-7), and finally through public conversations (IV.2.8). Their 
long private conversation (IV.2.8-39) has seven parts: the uncovering of Euthydemus’ 
desire for the ruling virtue (8-11), the relation between the just and the good (11-18), the 
relation between the unjust and the voluntary (19-20), knowledge and slavishness (21-
23), self-understanding and advantage (24-30), the good (31-36), and the definition of the 
demos (37-39). A final narrative section describes Socrates’ releasing of Euthydemus 
from the grip of philosophy (40). 
 The first and most obvious question posed by this chapter is: Why Euthydemus? 
Especially in the wake of Chapter One’s typology of natures, this choice of interlocutor – 
by Socrates, and by Xenophon – seems strange. Euthydemus fits within none of the four 
categories mentioned; he is neither a good nature, a haughty nature, a best nature, or a 
money-lover. Why does the peak of the Memorabilia focus on conversations with such a 
mediocre interlocutor? 
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 With typical urbanity Xenophon in fact prepared us, in Chapter One, for the 
entrance of Euthydemus: being a constant companion of Socrates was visibly 
choiceworthy “to one who examined with even limited/average (µετρίως) perception” 
(IV.1.1). Leaving behind or expanding upon Chapter One’s typology of natures, Chapter 
Two begins: “I shall now describe how he approached those who held that they had 
obtained the best education and were proud on account of their wisdom” (IV.2.1). 
Euthydemus believed that he had already obtained wisdom; therefore he was no longer a 
lover of wisdom; in other words, he was not philosophic (Strauss 94, Cf. Hiero I.30). 
Even the character of his prior desire and quest for wisdom strike an odd note: he “had 
collected many writings of the poets and of the sophists who were held in the highest 
repute, and due to these held himself to be already superior to his contemporaries on 
account of wisdom and had great hopes of surpassing everyone in being able to speak and 
take action” (IV.2.1). Euthydemus always saw learning as a means to future political 
action. He sought out the writings of those held in highest repute – not necessarily the 
writings that were genuinely best. On account of these writings themselves – not 
necessarily on account of understanding or even reading them – he held himself to be 
superior in wisdom. Repeatedly, Xenophon and his Socrates emphasize that Euthydemus 
was always primarily focused on “collecting” (συλλέγω) rather than absorbing these 
writings (IV.1.1, 8, 8). He assumed that the writings themselves (IV.2.8) were as valuable 
as the judgments buried within them (IV.2.9) and would make him “rich in virtue” (cf. 
I.6.14 with Strauss 29). 
 Despite his apparent interest in wisdom, Euthydemus proves to be passive and 
slow-witted (IV.2.6, 10). Though beautiful (IV.2.1, cf. I.2.29), kind-hearted (IV.2.11, 15), 
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and ambitious (IV.2.1), he shows no sign of philosophic promise. He was a conventional 
lover of gentlemanly virtue who spent much of his time in a bridle shop (IV.2.1). Why, 
then, did Socrates go to the trouble of returning to that bridle shop, at least three times, 
with varying strategies, in order to lure Euthydemus into private conversation? 
 
Euthydemus as a Test Case 
 
A closer analysis of Chapter Two reveals that Euthydemus possesses several 
unique traits, or rather a unique combination of traits not often found in conjunction, that 
render him a perfect interlocutor for the questions Socrates here wants to investigate. 
Though he does not fit into Chapter One’s typology of souls, he displays traits common 
to each type. He combines at least some form of the interest in learning (IV.2.2) with a 
mildly haughty pride (IV.2.1), along with – though he does not crave money – a money-
lover’s style of book collection (IV.2.8-9). In addition, he has all four of the basic 
motives to virtue. He desires to possess virtue (IV.2.1), to exercise it (IV.2.1), to benefit 
the city and other human beings through virtue (IV.1.11), and to benefit himself through 
rewards such as honor (IV.1.6.11). To a greater extent than any interlocutor in Book III, 
he combines all of these desires; his love of virtue is more complete. 
Euthydemus also displays, because of his (at least nominal) commitment to 
wisdom, a greater openness to critical questioning. But despite this openness, he has not 
yet been swayed or ‘infected’ with philosophic ideas, because he has not understood 
anything he has read (IV.2.23). All along, he has viewed reading as a labor and a sacrifice 
(IV.2.23). 
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His potential openness is combined with a serious piety. His first word in the 
Memorabilia is a religious oath (IV.2.8); he has traveled to Delphi twice (IV.2.24); he 
becomes seriously disturbed when his ability to pray comes into question (IV.2.36). In 
connection with this, he has a strong faith in justice, as evidenced by his 
discombobulation, dismay, and despair when Socrates shakes his confidence in justice or 
his understanding of it (IV.2.15, 20, 23, 36, 39).  
Perhaps his beauty is not unrelated to this faith. Beauty shines forth without effort 
– and brings about rewards – in a way that most virtues do not. It creates the kind of tight 
connection between virtue and happiness hoped for by Socrates’ young interlocutor in 
Chapter One of Book III (III.1.4). It may create an assumption that this kind of reward 
will continue, without great effort, and that all virtues are like this – naturally possessed, 
easy, and necessarily rewarded. This would go some way in explaining the strange 
assumption of ambitious Socratic interlocutors that they need not practice or learn the 
political things in order to become exalted political figures (IV.2.2, 6, Cf. Plato’s 
Alcibiades 105b, 109d). Beauty persuades that perfection is possessed or possible. The 
tendency of beauty to foster great hopes, great ambitions, and a strong faith in justice 
might explain, to some extent, the fact that Socrates was interested in physically beautiful 
youths despite Xenophon’s claim to the contrary (IV.1.2, cf. Alcibiades 104a and 
Charmides 154b-c). 
Finally, Euthydemus combines superlative ambition with superlative mediocrity. 
This might in fact be part of his appeal as an interlocutor. If Socrates seeks to investigate 
certain opinions about justice, there is some chance that his testing of Euthydemus 
(IV.2.26) may result not in a benefit to the youth but in his corruption. It would be 
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dangerous to undertake such an investigation with one of the promising and powerful 
natures (IV.1.3-4). Much more safely can a youth like Euthydemus be involved. 
Euthydemus, then, presents a unique combination of prideful hope for virtue and 
humility, openness and piety, ambition and mediocrity. His soul is a spectrum of common 
traits not often found in a single place. He is, in a way, an everyman, extraordinarily 
average, the perfect interlocutor for the set of questions Socrates seeks to raise and 
answer here. To those questions we must turn. 
 
Revealing the Ambitions of Euthydemus 
 
To begin their private conversation, Socrates asks Euthydemus if he has really 
collected many of the writings of men said to have been wise. Euthydemus has; in fact, 
he is still collecting them, and will continue to acquire as many as he can. Socrates then 
exalts Euthydemus, puffing him up with pride. He guesses that Euthydemus seeks virtue, 
rather than merely honor and reputation, through acquiring these writings; he observes 
that Euthydemus is “pleased at this praise” (IV.2.9), which confirms his hypothesis. 
Socrates asks in what pursuit Euthydemus seeks to become good when he gathers 
(συλλέγεις) these writings. Out of uncertainty or modesty, Euthydemus is silent. Socrates 
suggests five arts: does Euthydemus seek to become a physician, a builder, a geometer, 
an astronomer, a rhapsode of Homer’s great verses? He seeks to be none of these. 
Euthydemus is not inclined to theoretical investigations. And yet he is contemptuous of 
rhapsodes as simpletons, perhaps because they lack the ability to give an account of the 
words they recite. 
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Socrates guesses, and Euthydemus emphatically agrees, that his desire is for “that 
virtue through which human beings become statesmen, fit to manage households, 
competent to rule, and beneficial to other human beings as well as themselves” (IV.2.11-
12). Euthydemus understands, intuitively, the unity of this virtue. Statesmanship is 
advantageous to the statesman (cf. I.1.8). The same virtue provides benefits to others and 
also provides benefits, in the highest or most important sense, to oneself. Socrates calls 
this virtue “the noblest virtue and greatest art, for it belongs to kings and is called kingly” 
(IV.2.11). The reference to kings, along with the preceding reference to Homer, calls to 
mind Socrates’ one-sided conversation with the general (III.2). The noblest virtue is 
simultaneously the greatest art; this virtue is equivalent to knowledge in the highest 
sense. Is this art knowable by human beings, or is it somehow divine (I.1.8-9, IV.8.10)? 
 
What is Justice? 
 
Socrates turns the conversation to justice. Has Euthydemus considered, he asks, 
whether it is possible to be good (rather than noble) at the kingly art, without being just? 
Euthydemus has in fact considered this, and responds that “it is not possible to be a good 
citizen without justice” (IV.2.11). A ruler, then, must be just – but Euthydemus’ response 
can be understood in two ways. Either the ruler must transcend the citizenry, and thus 
must possess all of the citizens’ virtues (including justice) and more; or, the ruler himself 
remains one of the citizens – and a good citizen – and thus must possess a good citizen’s 
virtues. It is very possible that Euthydemus holds both of these positions (cf. III.4). In any 
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event, Euthydemus does not for a moment think that a good ruler would transcend the 
political community to the point of transcending justice itself. 
 Socrates asks Euthydemus if he has achieved justice. He skips over defining 
justice; Euthydemus shows no inclination to define it. Euthydemus thinks, “at least, that 
[he] would appear no less just than anyone” (IV.2.12). His conception of justice, then, 
seems to be egalitarian. All good citizens are equally just, perhaps because they all abide 
by the law. But if justice as lawfulness is fundamentally egalitarian, and all possess it, 
how is it exalted? 
 Next, Socrates employs a strange analogy. “Just as builders are able to display 
their own works, would those who are just…” — here one would expect Socrates to ask 
if those who are just are able to display their own works. This analogical question would 
put a premium on just action over (or, as a proof or cause of) just character, on deed over 
disposition. But Socrates, instead of following his own analogy to its logical conclusion, 
shifts mid-sentence: “Just as builders are able to display their own works, would those 
who are just be able to explain theirs?” (IV.2.12). The emphasis shifts, mid-sentence, 
from deed to disposition, or at least from displayable action to articulable speech. 
Socrates turns the focus to being able to give an account of one’s works, rather than 
simply visibly performing just deeds or “appear[ing] no less just than anyone” (IV.2.12). 
But what are the works of the just, which the just must be able to explain? 
 Euthydemus finds Socrates’ suggestion – that he might not be able to explain the 
works of justice – strange and even silly. Of course he can explain the works of justice. 
He will, in a moment, make it clear that only Socrates, not he himself, finds it necessary 
to write down the just and the unjust works: “If, in your opinion, we have some need of 
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this in addition, do it” (IV.2.13). Euthydemus finds this whole process of articulating or 
verbally categorizing the works of justice childish, not because it is absurd but because it 
is so obviously easy. In contemporary terms, Euthydemus might be called a moral 
intuitionist. Everyone knows, in his heart, what justice is. And yet he does not see his 
intuition as simply an emotion. His own faith in the intuition is predicated upon the 
opinion that the intuition itself is rational, that it embodies or results from a rationally 
coherent account which could, if desired, be articulated. The intuition, he feels, is not a 
mere feeling or ‘hunch.’ It is not a matter of groundless faith, but embodies what is truly, 
and reasonably, right and good. 
 Euthydemus makes a mild attempt, however, to shift the conversation away from 
the works of justice and toward the works of injustice: “By Zeus, for my part, I can 
explain also [the works of] injustice, since it is possible every day to see and to hear not a 
few such things” (IV.2.12). He seeks to shift away from a positive conception of justice 
which requires works and the articulation of the reasons behind them, and back toward 
the negative, egalitarian, and deed-oriented conception of justice with which he began. 
We see also, with this comment, how Euthydemus could see justice as both negatively-
oriented (and egalitarian) and also exalted. Not all people are in fact equally just or 
lawful; he considers himself superior to those who are unjust; the unjust or unlawful are 
blameworthy and beneath him. 
 
The Asterisk of International Relations 
 
 Having written a ‘J’ for justice and an ‘I’ for injustice in the dirt of the bridle 
shop’s floor, Socrates questions Euthydemus about a series of actions: under which 
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column should each action be put? He follows, then, Euthydemus’ focus on visible deeds, 
his principle of eliminating any neutral zone between just and unjust,19 and, it turns out, 
his focus on the unjust rather than the just. Before asking how the actions of lying and 
deceiving should be categorized, Socrates asks whether they exist (cf. Lesser Hippias 
369b). Both of these exist, according to Euthydemus, and should be put under injustice. 
Doing mischief and enslaving are also unjust. His intuition tells him that it would be 
“terrible” if any of these actions were just, or if he and Socrates came to see them that 
way. 
 But, as it turns out, Euthydemus already sees them that way. When Socrates 
mentions an elected general’s action of enslaving “an unjust and hostile city,” 
Euthydemus says that this action would not, in fact, be unjust. Not only would it not be 
unjust, but it would be positively just (IV.2.15). Perhaps, by calling this action just, 
Euthydemus is simply bowing, reluctantly, to the policy of admitting no neutral actions, 
i.e. to the dichotomy set before him. All actions must be either just or unjust; therefore, 
what is not unjust must be just. 
But his responses are not reluctant but enthusiastic. When Socrates mentions the 
use of deception against a wartime enemy, Euthydemus emphatically claims – without 
being prompted – that this action is positively just. The pursuit of the city’s good or the 
common good, then, is an aspect of justice that overrides justice as lawfulness. This 
precedence of the common good is revealed by the realm of international relations. 
                                                
19 If there is in fact a neutral zone between the unjust and the just, that neutral zone must at times 
be defined by the city as just and praiseworthy (to exalt simple lawfulness), and at times as unjust 
and blameworthy (to spur citizens to go ‘beyond the call of duty’). Cf. Laws 644e with 878b, 
881b-c, 914a, and 921d-e. 
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Euthydemus’ own ambition – which Socrates evokes by calling the agent in this thought 
experiment an elected general – points beyond justice as lawfulness. 
 Socrates then mentions a third action: stealing and seizing an enemy’s belongings. 
Once again, Euthydemus emphatically agrees that this is just. This action is new – not 
only because it had not been mentioned in their prior list, but also because it may 
represent an expansion of the principle being implicitly laid down. It is not clear that 
stealing and seizing an enemy’s belongings is necessarily intended to serve the common 
good of the city. If it is only for the good of the army, or only for the good of the elected 
general himself, is it still just? Euthydemus expresses no qualms. In war, does the pursuit 
of one’s own good know no lawful bounds? If lawfulness disappears in the absence of an 
overarching structure of enforcement, what is the status of lawfulness within the city? 
 Here Euthydemus establishes a new principle. He had thought Socrates had 
“asked about these things with regard to one’s friends alone” (IV.2.15). Categorical 
prohibitions do apply, according to his new principle, but only to friends. And yet his 
new formulation is striking, for two reasons. First, Socrates had pointed Euthydemus’ 
attention to war between cities; we might expect, then, Euthydemus to say that justice as 
lawfulness applies only to allies. But he says, instead, that it applies only to friends. This 
leaves it as an open question whether categorical prohibitions might be justly ignored 
even within the city, in actions taken against domestic or personal enemies. But, more 
importantly, his formulation is striking for a second reason. Socrates had not merely 
called the enemy city unfriendly, but rather “unjust and hostile” (IV.2.15). But 
Euthydemus has picked out only one part of that formulation. It is possible that he is 
simply conflating those who are friends with those who are just (and those who are 
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enemies with those who are unjust). In that case, he is simply using the word ‘friends’ as 
shorthand for those who are both friends and just. But it is also possible that his choice 
displays a fundamental yet subconscious preference: perhaps friendship is in some way 
closer to Euthydemus’ heart than is justice as lawfulness, or rather becoming its enforcer. 
Perhaps this is because being helpful and lawful with friends aligns more closely with his 
self-interest or natural affection than does a lawfulness based on respecting or enforcing 
justice in the abstract, independent of personal ties. At any rate, his understanding of 
justice as lawfulness is altered or refined not by the standard of justice itself but by the 
standard of friendship. 
 Categorical prohibitions apply, then, but only with friends. Lying to enemies is 
just, but lying to friends is unjust: “to these at least one should be as straightforward as 
possible” (IV.2.16). And yet the ambiguity in Socrates’ phrase “as straightforward as 
possible” already points to the next line of argument. 
 
The Asterisk of the Good 
 
 Socrates now offers three examples which disprove Euthydemus’ claim that, with 
friends, justice means obeying categorical prohibitions on certain actions. It is not unjust, 
but rather positively just, for a general to lie to his troops in order to cheer them up. It is 
just for a father to deceive his son into taking medicine which will make him healthy. It is 
just, by Zeus, for a friend to steal his friend’s sword in order to prevent his suicide 
(IV.2.17). The example of the general establishes the principle that in war, it is just to 
abandon what is lawful, even with friends, in an attempt to seek the common good or the 
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army’s good. The general’s good intent is emphasized; no mention is made of his success 
in seeking the common good. The example of the father who deceives his son establishes 
the principle that even in peacetime, the intent to help friends by deceiving them, if 
paired with success in that attempt, is just. The example of the friend who prevents his 
friend’s suicide combines the circumstances of peace with the mere intent to do good 
(rather than success in that effort): in peacetime, it is just to steal from a friend in an 
attempt to help him. 
Euthydemus began with an intuition that justice meant lawfulness. Justice as 
lawfulness makes a demand that—and indeed, part of its dignity or nobility lies in its 
demand that—one must obey the written or unwritten laws always, i.e. categorically: 
even or especially at the sacrifice of what seems good. But now, under the pressure of 
Socratic dialectics, he has almost immediately moved to the opposite pole. When faced 
with a clear choice between the lawful and the good, the law – according to Euthydemus’ 
new intuition – must bow. It must bow not only to the common good of the community 
but also to the good of family members and friends. What can prevent this precedence of 
the good from extending even further? What prevents, for instance, a person’s calling it 
just even to sacrifice lawfulness in pursuit of his own good? It seems that Euthydemus’ 
intuitions – that justice means obeying categorical prohibitions, and that justice must be 
good – are in contradiction with each other. If he always believed implicitly that 
lawfulness would in every case result in the good, or even in his own good, we are left to 
wonder what was the basis for that confidence. 
In response to the examples of the general, the father, and the friend, Euthydemus, 
discombobulated, “change[s] where [he] put the things mentioned, if it’s permitted” 
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(IV.2.18). This statement is unclear, but it seems to mean that, now, any action could go 
in either the column of justice or the column of injustice. Any action could be either just 
or unjust depending on the relevant circumstances; that is, depending on what is good. 
But is this new principle – that the good must override the lawful – a mere modification 
of justice as lawfulness, or in fact its destruction? Socrates says that modifying the 
placement of the things mentioned must be permitted, “much more than to put them 
incorrectly.” Even the sacredness or fixed character of what is lawful, according to 
Socrates, must bow to the search for the truth. But if the good must override the lawful, 
does justice give any advice regarding whose good must be pursued? By what principle 
or law could this question be decided, if the principled nature of justice is the very thing 




Socrates next asks Euthydemus: “who is more unjust among those who deceive 
their friends so as to harm them: the one who does so willingly or unwillingly?” Though 
he is no longer sure of his own answers, Euthydemus responds, naturally, that “the one 
who lies willingly is more unjust” (IV.2.19). Perhaps even unwilling deception may be 
called unjust, but injustice in the fullest sense must be willed – that is, it must be 
knowingly and intentionally chosen; this is the city’s, and the citizen’s, understanding of 
injustice. 
                                                
20 Perhaps justice, at this point in the conversation, has come to mean simply helping friends and 
harming enemies (cf. Strauss 97); Socrates does not, as he does with Polemarchus in the 
Republic, delve into the problematically amoral nature of this principle. 
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Next, Socrates learns from Euthydemus that, in his own opinion, there is 
“learning and understanding/scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) of the just, in the same way 
there is of writing” (IV.2.20). And yet, as Socrates reminds him, those who are willingly 
bad at writing are understood to be more skilled in the art of writing than those who write 
badly unwillingly. Therefore, if justice too is an art, the man who is willingly unjust must 
understand the art of justice better. If justice is a matter of understanding, he must in fact 
be more just than the man who is unwillingly unjust, who does not understand justice 
(IV.2.20; cf. Lesser Hippias 373c-376a). 
Two flaws appear in this argument. First, it is left ambiguous in what sense the 
unwillingly unjust man is unwilling. It is not clear that the unwillingly unjust man does, 
as Euthydemus agrees that he does, fail to understand justice itself. Perhaps he merely 
fails to understand the circumstances at hand when he acts. One may understand, for 
instance, that it is unjust to poison a friend, yet fail to understand that the meatloaf one 
feeds him is poisoned. Misunderstanding – or lacking full control over – one’s actions is 
not equivalent to misunderstanding justice. 
Connected with this first flaw, Socrates here abstracts from intent. Being unjust in 
the fullest sense means having an unjust intention. Therefore the knowingly unjust man is 
unjust, or ‘bad at justice,’ in a way that that the intentionally bad runner is not bad at 
running. Justice is different from the other arts in that one’s being good at the art of 
justice depends largely on one’s never for a moment intending to do badly at the art.  
But this apparent flaw in the argument points to a deeper problem. Socrates may 
in fact be justified in abstracting from intent, given that justice is a peculiar art: if justice 
is an art, it is the one art whose proper performance is always and necessarily good. A 
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knower of the art of running may at times find it good to run poorly on purpose. But how 
could a knower of the art of justice – if knowing the art of justice means, most crucially, 
knowing that being just is always good for the just in the most important sense, i.e. good 
for their souls – ever intentionally act unjustly? If the virtue of justice is simply 
knowledge or prudence, then a just intent will be a mere byproduct of, and inseparable 
from, that knowledge; if knowledge is established, intent need not be explicitly 
considered. But if justice is necessarily good for the just actor, then anyone who fails to 
be just necessarily misunderstood justice in the crucial sense and is therefore not culpable 
for his injustice. Unjust actions, then, are never intentional (i.e., knowing), but are rather 
the result of ignorance or insanity. But if this is the case, how can we make sense of 
praise and blame, reward and punishment? 
It seems that, to make sense of Euthydemus’ initial intuition that willingly (and 
knowingly) unjust men not only exist but are especially blameworthy, we must posit a 
second intuition: Euthydemus simultaneously views justice not as a learnable art, nor as 
good for the just, but as a sacrifice. Only this intuition, that justice is bad for the just, can 
make sense of the citizen’s blame (rather than pity) of those who are unjust, his feeling 
that the unjust ‘get away with something’ and deserve ‘payback,’ and his sentiment that 
the just deserve not merely congratulation but reward (e.g. honor) as a recompense for 
their noble sacrifice. 
Then is justice bad for the just, or good? Euthydemus can be content with neither 
answer in isolation from the other; it seems that his intuitions again contradict each other. 
To call just action simply good for the just could not match up with his experience of the 
world or with the city’s activities of justly punishing and honoring; but to call it simply 
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bad could not match up with his hopes, his experience of the degraded dispositions of the 
unjust, or the city’s rhetoric. He began with the opinion that the unjust were willingly 
unjust and thus blameworthy, but Socrates – thinking through Euthydemus’ own opinion 
that justice is good – showed him that a knower of justice would never be unjust. If 
Euthydemus, as a representative citizen, simultaneously views justice as bad and as good 
for the just, then it seems the tension within the ruling virtue (cf. III.2) may in fact be a 




 Socrates next asks Euthydemus his opinion of those who contradict themselves. 
Such people, Euthydemus understands, must be ignorant (IV.2.21). Is slavishness, 
Socrates asks, due to knowledge or due to ignorance? Euthydemus, perhaps because of 
his admiration of philosophy, does not question this dichotomy or attempt to substitute a 
new one (such as power and impotence, or freedom and coercion); the slavish are slavish 
due to ignorance.  
Socrates then mentions three arts: Is slavishness the result of ignorance in 
smithing, in building, in shoemaking? With the central reference to the builder’s art, 
Socrates reminds us how far he and Euthydemus have moved from a perspective which 
would claim that justice means the visible display of just works (IV.2.12); now they seem 
to agree that justice must be a form of knowledge or wisdom. The slavish are slavish due 
to ignorance of the noble, good, and just things (IV.2.22). Euthydemus says that this is 
true, in his opinion. The ordinary citizen, then, has a philosophic impulse, in that he 
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desires not simply to act justly, nor merely to possess intuitions about the noble, the good, 
and the just, but to possess rational and articulable knowledge of them. Because 
Euthydemus’ intuitions have been shown to be contradictory (he viewed law as both 
sacred and as subservient to the good, and he viewed injustice as both bad for the unjust 
and as blameworthy), he has lost faith in them; ‘intuitionism’ was never fully satisfactory 
to him, except when paired with the tacit assumption that his intuitions were rational and 
represented real knowledge. As Socrates will later claim in reference to the good, perhaps 
Euthydemus “didn’t examine these things due to [his] excessive trust that [he] knew 
them” (IV.2.36). 
 Having been shown his own ignorance regarding the most important things, and 
thus his slavishness, Euthydemus cries out in despair to the gods. His piety, it seems, is 
intact. He had thought that in pursuing philosophy he would “be educated to the highest 
degree in what befits a man yearning for gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness)”; now 
he is dispirited that his previous “pains” or labors have been worthless. It seems that 
Euthydemus always viewed philosophic activity as a means or foundation for the pursuit 
of virtue, not as virtuous in itself, nor inherently productive of virtue. Study he viewed as 
a sacrifice, as a laborious or painful exercise. Now he despairs, for he knows of no other 
road he might travel “to become better” (IV.2.23). 
 
Self-Knowledge and Happiness 
 
 Without warning or explanation, Socrates asks Euthydemus if he has ever gone to 
the shrine at Delphi, whose inscription reads ‘know thyself.’ Here Socrates grounds an 
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exhortation to self-knowledge in an appeal to religion. Euthydemus’ piety, though 
perhaps shaken, appears again to be intact; he swears by Zeus and does not question 
Socrates’ appeal. He responds that, despite the shrine’s exhortation, he did not attempt to 
examine who he was because he thought that he already knew. Socrates, however, 
informs him that true self-knowledge is neither trivial nor easy to obtain. One with true 
self-knowledge, according to Socrates’ statement, is “one who has examined himself as 
to how he is with regard to the use to which human beings are put and who knows his 
capacity” (IV.2.25). But Euthydemus’ opinion is that “one who doesn’t know his 
capacity is ignorant of himself.” Euthydemus, then, chooses to focus on capacity as most 
important, rather than measuring himself according to “the use to which human beings 
are put”; though unphilosophic, he again tests positive for an inclination toward the 
philosophic view. 
 Socrates next connects self-knowledge to a form of perfect and perhaps 
Machiavellian happiness. Those who attain self-knowledge can “procure what they need 
and do well,” and “through the use of other [human beings] procure the good things and 
guard against the bad ones” (IV.2.26); they will be trusted and attain great political power 
instead of punishment and disgrace. Prudent men, like cities, must concern themselves 
with fighting winnable battles, not just ones (IV.2.29). The promise of this great and 
amoral happiness is quite appealing to Euthydemus, perhaps because his faith in justice 
or lawfulness has been so shaken. He pleads with Socrates to show him the starting point 






 The starting point for self-knowledge, according to Socrates, is knowledge of 
what is good. Euthydemus believes he knows this, at least. If he did not, he would be 
“more common even than slaves” (IV.2.31). He immediately claims that health, and the 
causes of health, are good; sickness, and the causes of sickness, are bad. But Socrates 
shows him that health may cause bad things, and that sickness may cause good things. 
Health is not an absolute but only a conditional good. Even the supposedly mighty can 
fall victim to chance, harmed or killed by their strength. 
 Wisdom, Euthydemus next claims, must be “indisputably good.” But Socrates 
shows him that wisdom, too, can lead to misery. Chance rules all (cf. I.1.8); nothing is 
predictable or secure; existence is fundamentally terrifying. Wisdom, like health, is only 
a conditional good. 
 Being happy, Euthydemus counters, is the least debatable good. Socrates does not 
dispute this, but ‘happiness’ must be given content. If happiness is to include “beauty, 
strength, riches, reputation, or anything else of the sort,” then it too will be rendered 
conditionally good. Euthydemus emphatically claims that these attributes must be 
included. Socrates then shows that all four of these – and political power itself, which he 
had puffed up as such a glorious good – do not equal or bring perfect happiness; they too 
are only conditional goods. 
 Here Euthydemus despairs and comes out with a strange exclamation: “And yet, 
if I do not speak correctly even when I praise being happy, I agree that I do not know 
even what one should pray to the gods for” (IV.2.36). But Socrates had not been speaking 
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of the gods. This non sequitur must be understood in conjunction with the chapter which 
comes next, Chapter Three, in which Socrates finds it necessary to make Euthydemus 
“moderate concerning the gods” (IV.3.2) – and even to urge him that “one should not 
have contempt for the things that are unseen,” such as the gods (IV.3.14). It seems that, 
although Euthydemus began with a firm piety, something in Chapter Two’s conversation 
about the just and the good came to shake his faith; this seems to be the moment at which 
his faith was shaken. The inquiry into the contradictions within his understanding of 
justice may have been a necessary preparation for this response. But it seems that his 
faith is acutely damaged only when Socrates proves – or seems to Euthydemus to prove – 
that perfect happiness is impossible. It is at this moment that his confidence in the 
possibility or desirability of contact with the gods – or even his faith in their very 
existence – seems to falter. This response, then, would point Socrates toward a hypothesis 
that revelation or contact with the gods can exist without the belief that one’s 
understanding of justice is at all coherent (cf. Martin Luther on grace), that such contact 
may be the result of a hope, and that piety may be, at its core, self-interested. That 
conclusion, if true, would be extremely problematic politically: if law has been shown to 
be theoretically and practically fragile, piety would become all the more necessary to 
restrain selfishness. But if piety itself were founded upon self-interest, its dependability 




 Finally, Socrates asks Euthydemus whether – given his ambition to preside over a 
democratically ruled city – he can define the ‘demos.’ He defines it as the poor; and yet 
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poverty, by his own definition, is best defined not in absolute terms but as relative to 
need. Even a tyrant, if his wealth fails to match his wild needs, is in fact poor and thus a 
member of the demos (IV.2.39). 
Here Socrates, in preparation for the next chapter, attempts to make Euthydemus 
less needy for external goods; even tyrants, if they have needy souls, are neither happier 
nor more exalted than the poor. Such a realization should move Euthydemus away from a 
focus on visible success and toward a focus on his own disposition, which he can more 
effectively control. Perhaps Euthydemus’ fervid ambition can be channeled inward, 
toward the creation of a virtuous and happy soul. 
But Euthydemus is too caught up in conventional understandings of worth to 
abandon them. Rather than accept this argument regarding tyrannical poverty, he instead 
assumes that he has blundered in the argument and is worthless. Tyrants cannot have 




Xenophon tells us that Euthydemus left this seven-part conversation altogether 
dispirited (ἀθύµως), “having contempt for himself and holding that he was really a slave” 
(IV.2.39). Socrates put many others into this state (but cf. IV.8.11) who never returned to 
speak with him. But Euthydemus did return and began to shadow Socrates constantly, 
even imitating some of his pursuits. And yet Socrates, upon seeing his condition, 
“disturbed him as little as possible and explained in the most simple and clear manner 
what he held he should know and what he held best for him to pursue” (IV.2.40). 
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Socrates did not hold, then, that it was best for Euthydemus to pursue a Socratic life; 
when he began to imitate Socrates, then it became necessary to explain to him what was 
best for him to pursue. Euthydemus was released, by Socrates, from philosophy. The 
chapter’s concluding sentence, quoted above, prepares us for the next chapter’s 

















                                                
21 Chapter Three’s quasi-philosophic or rhetorical character is confirmed by the opening 
sentence of Chapter Four, which reads: “Furthermore, he did not hide the judgment he had 






The Reconstruction of Piety (4.3) 
 
Chapter Three depicts Socrates’ effort to reconstruct or modify the piety of Euthydemus. 
It becomes clear that Euthydemus’ piety has always been a piety of neediness. Though he 
prays to the gods for many things (IV.2.36), it has “never once occurred to [him]” that the 
gods already “attentively furnish human beings with what they need” (IV.3.3). 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia seems to indicate that piety in human beings takes two 
fundamental forms: a piety of need, and a piety of gratitude. Socrates seeks in this 
chapter to move Euthydemus from the former to the latter. To accomplish this, Socrates 
lists with gusto the good things provided to human beings by the gods, or by nature: light, 
night, stars, the moon, the seasons which provide sustenance, water, fire, the kindly sun, 
the gradual nature of seasonal change, the provision of herbivorous animals, and the gifts 
of perception and explanation. 
 Problems, however, emerge. Euthydemus is told by Socrates to be grateful not 
only for the gods’ provision of light, without which we could not see, but also for their 
provision of night, “a most noble resting time” (IV.3.3). But if darkness were the natural 
status quo before the gods provided light, why should we thank them for darkness? Are 
we simply thanking them simply for not altering (or for restoring) it? Similarly, we are 
told to be grateful not only for the gods’ provision of abundant, useful, and delightful 
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sustenance from the earth (IV.3.5), but also for their provision of water, which “when 
mixed with all that sustains us, makes these things easier to digest and more beneficial as 
well as more pleasant” (IV.3.6). Could not the gods have made our food easy to digest as 
well as supremely beneficial and pleasant in the first place? An optimistically selective 
attention is perhaps healthy and conducive to happiness. But a great deal of piety here 
seems to consist in thanking and praising the gods for problems they themselves created, 
or could have avoided. 
 Fire presents us with a second problem. Socrates mentions “the procuring for us 
also of fire, an ally against cold, an ally against darkness, a coworker in every art and for 
all things that human beings equip themselves with for their benefit” (IV.3.7). But it is 
not made clear that fire was a gift of the gods; fire seems, rather, the result and epitome of 
human agency or art, a human response to flaws in an only half-hospitable natural world, 
which is often cold and dark. Why was art so necessary, if the gods were so kind in 
crafting nature? Socrates continues: “in sum, without fire, human beings equip 
themselves with nothing worth mentioning of the things useful for life” (IV.3.7). Here 
Socrates points – though quietly – to the uselessness or harshness of nature in the absence 
of human agency and artifice (cf. John Locke, Second Treatise §42-43). 
 Certain aspects of human existence are, in this chapter, entirely ignored. A 
comparison with Socrates’ earlier exhortation to piety (I.4.2) is instructive. “The beautiful 
Euthydemus” finds a message about the generosity of nature more plausible than did 
“Aristodemus, nicknamed ‘the Small’ ” (I.4.2). But Aristodemus’ skepticism was also 
due to a difference in the message. During the earlier exhortation, Socrates mentioned 
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death and Aristodemus immediately stopped speaking of divine love for human beings 
(I.4.7). Here, death is never mentioned. 
 The discussion of animals, too, is problematic. Socrates claims that animals “are 
born and sustained for the sake of human beings” (IV.3.10). And yet he points to the 
necessity of domesticating and breaking in animals to make them useful. He also dwells 
only on “grazing animals”; carnivores are never mentioned. 
 
The Socratic Experiment 
 
But the question of animals only arises because of an objection made by 
Euthydemus. He is not, in fact, a passive and obliging recipient of Socrates’ new form of 
piety. Socrates’ list of natural blessings has led him to examine “whether the gods have 
any other work than serving (θεραπεύειν) human beings. The only thing holding me back is 
that the other animals too participate in these things” (IV.3.9). Euthydemus’ complaint 
seems to be twofold: it is either unthinkable, or unsatisfying, that the gods would serve 
not only human beings but animals. It is unthinkable because animals are so obviously 
lowly. Gods who were truly exalted could not spend their time attending to the happiness 
of hogs (cf. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed II.11, III.12-14, 16). And yet this 
objection only points to a deeper problem: from the perspective of truly exalted gods, 
human beings would be, essentially, as lowly as animals. Why would the gods serve 
human beings (cf. 1.4.10)? It seems that ruling or serving gods are emphatically political, 
prone to the same theoretical tensions as human rulers (cf. III.4). Second, Euthydemus 
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may find the idea of divine aid to animals inherently unsatisfying. But to understand this 
dissatisfaction, we must investigate more carefully his responses in this section. 
Upon close inspection, Euthydemus’ responses do not remain static over the 
course of this chapter but in fact display a marked trajectory of waning enthusiasm. When 
Socrates describes the blessings of light and night, Euthydemus calls them “deserving of 
gratitude.” The stars, moon, and sustenance, he says, “are very indicative of a love of 
human beings” (IV.3.5). But his enthusiasm has already peaked. The provision of water 
in great quantity is not indicative of love but only “forethought” (IV.3.6). Fire indicates 
“a surpassing love of human beings,” but perhaps it is merely self-love by human beings; 
it may dawn on Euthydemus that the use of fire is, even in the traditional myths, the 
result of human agency. The kindliness of the sun in not allowing us to burn or freeze 
garners only a tepid response from Euthydemus: “these things too are altogether like 
things that happen for the sake of human beings” (IV.3.8). Then comes his objection and 
Socrates’ discussion regarding animals. 
But here it becomes apparent that Socrates is not merely constructing a piety of 
gratitude for Euthydemus’ sake or for the sake of damage control. He is, in fact, 
simultaneously running an experiment. He is attempting to test Euthydemus, to see how 
much traction he can get, with an everyman, by introducing a new piety: a piety of this-
worldly gratitude and self-sufficiency. His new religious outlook invokes no actively 
providential gods, but only detached designers who never interfere with nature and its 
necessities. 
And yet Euthydemus’ tepid responses indicate that he is becoming more and more 
dissatisfied (and finally rebellious), even as the natural blessings mount. Socrates, 
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attempting to restore some enthusiasm, mentions perception, which enables us to 
differentiate between the noble and the beneficial and to choose what is good (IV.3.11). 
He adds calculation of the advantageous and “the gift of explanation, through which, by 
teaching, we share with one another all the good things, live collectively, establish laws, 
and partake of political life” (IV.3.11). These laws are emphatically not created or 
sanctioned by the gods but by human beings. They are based on reason, not revelation. 
But these blessings are not good enough. The gods, Euthydemus mildly responds, 
are merely “very attentive to human beings” (IV.3.12). Losing ground, Socrates concedes 
divination, which offers us glimpses of the future through vague signs (IV.3.12). But 
neither is this enough for Euthydemus. Dissatisfied, he demands a providence that is 
personal, as well as specific and clear (IV.3.12, cf. I.4.15). Socrates rambles desperately 
about the invisibility of the gods and their works; he attempts to retain a non-providential 
and detached demiurge as the cornerstone of his new theology, “the one who places 
together and keeps together the whole cosmos, in which all things are noble and good.” 
This demiurge “does unerring service,” but he does so “more quickly than thought,” 
rendering prayer or contact with him unnecessary; “while seen to be doing the greatest 
things,” he (or it) is “unseen by us as he manages (οἰκονοµῶν) them” (IV.3.13). This 
household manager in the sky mirrors and embodies the Socratic outlook on politics. 
Neither noble nor retributive, neither actively providential nor interventionist, he is not a 
ruling god in any traditional or exalted sense. 
But after Socrates’ long speech about the blessings of the demiurge, the 
experiment definitively breaks down. Despite all of these natural goods and proofs of a 
kindly managerial god or gods, Euthydemus is not happy. He is not, as one might expect, 
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cheerfully grateful, but rather dispirited or hopeless (ἀθυµῶ). These gifts are not enough 
for him. He seeks to “repay the gods’ benefactions with the gratitude they deserve” 
(IV.3.15). Gratitude is essential to being just (II.2.2); Euthydemus seeks to become just, 
restore his good standing with the gods, and perhaps become worthy of even greater 
goods than previously received. The goods received thus far are not enough. The 
construction of a this-worldly piety based on natural blessings has failed. 
It is at this precise moment – when this world has proven to be insufficient for 
Euthydemus – that Socrates abruptly, and without warning, allows law to enter. He 
advises Euthydemus not to be dispirited, for it is common knowledge that one may 
gratify the gods through obeying the law of the city. Here Socrates opens the floodgates 
of conventional, providential piety: he allows not only the law of the city to enter, but 
also sacrifices, nobility, visibly honoring the gods, and, through pleasing the gods, 
“hoping for the greatest goods (τά µέγιστα ἀγαθά)” (IV.3.17). Suddenly the gods demand 
lawfulness, watch carefully over our actions, and promise to respond to our lawfulness by 
satisfying our most naturally unsatisfiable longings. It would not be moderate, Socrates 
says, “for someone to hope for more from others than from those able to benefit in the 
most important things/to the greatest extent, nor would it be moderate to hope for this 
other than if one would please them. And how would he please them more than if he 
obeyed them in the highest degree?” (IV.3.17). Socrates has proven to himself that this 
world, in its natural state, leaves an average (or even a naturally gifted) man dissatisfied, 
or even hopeless. At this point he allows lawfulness and all its associated hopes to enter. 
Without them, men and societies would be less happy and less robust. If Euthydemus 
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may be taken as representative, then it would seem that a this-worldly piety of gratitude 
for nature as it is can never be sufficient or satisfactory for mortal men. 
The political implications of Socrates’ failed experiment are both disheartening 
and heartening. First, Socrates would seem to have gathered some evidence that human 
beings cannot be fully satisfied through politics or on a political plane (cf. Nietzsche, 
Untimely Meditations III.4). Eternal dissatisfaction with political life may imply eternal 
political strife. But there is also a more heartening message to be drawn from the 
uncovering of that dissatisfaction and the injection of law and lawfulness which 
immediately follows. It seems that it is precisely the void or dissatisfaction human beings 
feel with this world which enables law and lawfulness to get a handle on us, to take deep 
root in our souls and direct us —because it offers a release from that pain and a promise 
of the greatest of goods. Political life may become stable and healthy precisely because of 
our fundamental dissatisfaction with life in this world. 
 
The Moderate and the Pious 
 
Xenophon concludes this chapter with the claim that “by saying such things and 
himself doing them he rendered his companions both more pious and more moderate” 
(IV.3.18). As Strauss points out, this implies that piety and moderation are two different 
things (105). Perhaps those companions made more pious and those companions made 
more moderate were two different groups. Perhaps some of Socrates’ companions were 
made more moderate by viewing Euthydemus’ responses and thus abandoning their 
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Justice as Lawfulness (4.4) 
 
Chapter Four presents the Socratic teaching that the just is the lawful. It is part of 
Xenophon’s defense of Socrates that Socrates proves the just to be equivalent to the 
lawful to Hippias, a Sophist and a “famous or notorious despiser of the laws,” rather than 
to Euthydemus (Strauss 108). It is very possible, however, that Euthydemus – though not 
mentioned here – was present for this conversation, especially given his apparent 
absorption of its message (IV.6.6). The chapter as a whole has seven sections: an opening 
narrative section which introduces two guiding problems (IV.4.1-4); Hippias’ entrance 
and unarticulated definition of justice (5-8); Socrates’ first definition of justice (9-12); 
Socrates’ second definition of justice (12-13); Hippias’ objection and Socrates’ rebuttal 
(13-14); Socrates’ defense of lawfulness as advantageous for city and individual (15-17); 
and the discussion of unwritten or divine law (19-25). 
 
The Problems of Regime and Benefit 
 
 The two guiding problems of this chapter are intimated by its very first sentence: 
Socrates showed his judgment concerning justice even in deed, “by dealing with 
everyone in private in a lawful and beneficial manner; and in public by being so obedient 
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to rulers in what the laws command, both in the city and on campaigns, that it was 
thoroughly clear that he was orderly beyond the others” (IV.4.1). By mentioning them 
separately, Xenophon implies that the lawful and the beneficial are not the same (Strauss 
107). One guiding question of the chapter, then, will be: Do the lawful and the good align 
(cf. IV.2)? If so, under what conditions? 
 This first sentence also contains the strange phrasing that Socrates was “obedient 
to rulers in what the laws command.” Did he obey the rulers, or the laws? Does this 
phrase mean that the commands of the laws align with, are equivalent to, or consist 
merely in the commands of the rulers? Or does it mean that Socrates obeyed the rulers 
only insofar as their commands aligned with some higher and more legitimate law? But 
don’t the rulers make the laws? This chapter, taken as a whole, will contain the Socratic 
response to what is now known as legal positivism. Its second guiding question, then, 
will be: What is the relation between law and regime? This question implies three more: 
Does law have a more solid basis than the command of a given regime? If so, what? And 
if not, can law and lawfulness be respected? 
 Socrates, it would seem, found some higher authority for law than the given 
regime: this opening narrative section emphasizes repeatedly his defiance before the 
ruling regime, in the name of the lawful. He defended the democratically-instituted laws 
of Athens not out of respect for the demos but even in defiance of it (IV.4.2). Likewise, 
he disobeyed the Thirty Tyrants when they “forbade conversing with the young;” he 
alone disobeyed “due to the fact that they were commanding him to do what was contrary 
to the laws” (IV.4.3). But we are led to wonder: what laws? Were not the only laws in 
place the laws of the Thirty? In fact, Socrates himself had earlier called the edicts of the 
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Thirty “laws,” and had even inquired of them carefully (though ironically) regarding the 
precise content of the law so as not to “inadvertently break the law in some way” (I.2.34). 
Why is Socrates here so confident that law transcends regime when he earlier seemed, at 
least implicitly, to define law as whatever the ruling regime said it was – that is, to be a 
strict legal positivist? What explains Socrates’ transformation from timid legal positivist 
to crusading moral firebrand? Even “customary things in the law court,” such as flattery – 
which was not against the laws of Athens – were considered by Socrates to be “contrary 
to the laws” (IV.4.4) and thus prohibited. What laws are guiding Socrates’ action? Is he 
committed to the spirit of the laws, or to the laws of the fatherland? How – and with what 




 When Hippias came to Athens, Xenophon tells us, he heard Socrates “saying to 
some people” that it was a wonder that one can easily find teachers of many arts, but that 
no one knows how or where to learn justice (IV.4.5). As Strauss points out, this is a very 
strange statement coming from a man about to define the just as the lawful; the laws of 
the city can be taught by any good citizen (Strauss 109). Hippias mocks Socrates for 
repeating the same things he has long been saying; Socrates confirms that accusation’s 
truth. His claim that no one understands or can teach justice, then, is not new; he has 
always said this; equating the just and the lawful is highly atypical for him, or even 
hypocritical. Socrates mocks Hippias back, asking if he seeks novelty even at the expense 
of consistency, coherence, and truth (cf. IV.2.21). Hippias is consistent regarding letter 
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and number; but regarding justice, he does have a novel teaching or definition which will 
shut down all debate forever (IV.4.7). 
 Socrates is overjoyed at this news: “By Hera, great is the good you’re saying that 
you have found, if jurors will cease being divided in their votes; citizens will cease 
contradicting one another, bringing lawsuits, and forming factions concerning the just 
things; the cities will cease disagreeing about the just things and going to war” (IV.4.8). 
A universally-accepted definition of justice promises to end all strife. But Socrates’ ironic 
joy points to three problems in his own impending definition of justice as lawfulness. 
First, the disharmony between jurors points to the fact that even law does not 
settle all strife; the application or applicability of the law to concrete circumstances 
remains a matter of dispute. 
Second, the mention of war points to the problematic relation between law and 
international relations. If the just is the law of a city, how is one to arbitrate disputes 
between cities, i.e. between entire systems of law? The very presence of competing legal 
systems is a challenge to a definition of justice as the lawful, unless some cosmic or 
universal law can be discovered. If it cannot, can citizens truly view their own particular 
city’s laws as absolute? Or will the very existence of other societies be an eternal threat to 
their laws and their lawfulness? If so, the only solutions would seem to be either a policy 
of extreme isolationism (a totally closed society) or the creation of one world 
government. 
Third and centrally, Socrates points to the fact that the dispute between systems of 
law in fact occurs not only between cities but within them. In other words, ‘the asterisk of 
the international realm’ in fact applies within cities, because each city is not a monolith 
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but a cauldron of competing factions, each vying to be the ruling (and law-making) 
regime. To form “factions concerning the just things” is to aim, ideally, at the imposition 
of one’s own laws. But if a city itself is always in a kind of state of war, how can its laws 
– which represent not the city but merely a part of the city, and aim not at the common 
good but at the good of the ruling part – be treated with any respect? 
 
Socrates’ First Definition of Justice 
 
 Hippias refuses to offer his novel account or definition of justice until Socrates 
offers his own. Offering a definition of justice is apparently highly atypical for Socrates, 
who spends most of his time refuting others. But Socrates claims that he constantly 
shows his opinion about justice, by deed. “Or is it not your opinion that one’s deed is 
more worthy testimony than one’s speech?” (IV.4.10). The trajectory of the discussion, it 
seems, will be tailored to or dictated by Hippias’s own preferences and psychology. 
Because Hippias prefers deed to speech, Socrates will give a definition of justice based 
on deeds or the visible restraint from deeds. Socrates has never been perceived “bearing 
false witness or making a false accusation or casting friends or cities into civil faction or 
doing anything else unjust” (IV.4.11, cf. Republic 442e). His initial definition of justice, 
then, is “refraining from the unjust things.” Like Euthydemus, he has a negative 
definition of justice (cf. IV.2.12); unlike Euthydemus, he may not view justice in this 
sense as exalted. His reformulation is that he thought that “not wanting to do injustice 
was a sufficient display of justice” (IV.4.12). It is unclear, given the lack of parallelism 
between the two definitions offered, whether, in Socrates’ estimation, it is the visible 
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refraining from unjust deeds, or the internal lack of a desire to commit them (i.e. the 
possession of a good disposition) which constitutes his justice. 
 However, Hippias is not satisfied with this initial and perhaps truer definition of 
Socratic justice. He desires a more positive definition; Socrates must say not merely what 
the just don’t do, but what they do. Allowing himself to be dictated by Hippias’ 
dissatisfaction, Socrates offers a new definition. 
 
Socrates’ Second Definition: Justice as Lawfulness 
 
 To “please” Hippias, Socrates says that the lawful is just; he accepts Hippias’ 
interpretation that he is claiming the just is equivalent to the lawful (IV.4.12, cf. Strauss 
110). But Hippias is still confused: what law is Socrates referencing? Socrates explains 
that he means “the laws of a city.” But this is a strange statement. What are “a city’s 
laws” in general, or in the abstract? Aren’t there only laws of particular cities, which are 
ruled by particular regimes? 
 According to Hippias, “the laws of a city” means “what the citizens agreed upon 
and wrote as to what one must do and refrain from” (IV.4.13). He has an eminently and 
exclusively democratic understanding of law; he does not seem to understand the 
problem of regime (cf. I.2.42-46). The laws, he says, are what “the citizens agreed upon 
and wrote” – but which citizens? Literally all of them, or only a portion? 
 Hippias next agrees that to engage in political life lawfully is to do what is just, 
and to do just deeds is equivalent to (or necessarily correlated with) being just. He seems 
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to have a great, though buried, respect for lawfulness. At last he shakes himself awake, as 




 Hippias objects to the definition of justice as lawfulness on the grounds that the 
laws are often changed and are thus not to be taken seriously (IV.4.14). Socrates responds 
that, “war, too, the cities have often begun, only to make peace again.” The mockery of 
law and lawfulness is then equated by Socrates with the mockery of patriotic and 
courageous soldiers “who eagerly bring aid to their fatherlands in wars” (IV.4.14). If 
Hippias is to mock law, he must mock courageous soldiers as well. 
 This analogy between law and war is faulty. Wars are designed to end; in fact, 
they are most clearly understood not as ends in themselves but as means to victory and 
thus peace (Laws 628c-628e). Laws, on the other hand, are almost invariably designed 
not as fleeting nor as means to their own obsolescence but as enduring and reasonable 
means to the common good. To change or revoke a law is thus an admission that it was a 
bad or foolish law; but to end a war or achieve peace is not an admission that it was a bad 
or foolish war. 
 But what about unreasonable wars? Socrates’ analogy, though faulty on its face, 
points to a deep tension in Hippias’ soul. The analogy indicates that if Hippias wants to 
mock lawfulness, he must also be willing to mock patriotic courage in the service of 
foolish or unreasonable wars. Courage untethered from a noble end is ignoble. But 
Hippias, like any good citizen, would never fail to praise a courageous soldier, no matter 
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how foolish the war: “theirs not to reason why.” His tacit, unconditional respect for 
courage goes together with – and is perhaps a form of – his even more tacit respect for 
lawfulness. At the mention of courage and the fatherland, Hippias swears emphatically by 
Zeus and denies that he would ever blame the courageous (IV.4.14). 
 
The Advantages of Lawfulness 
 
 Socrates next outlines the advantages of law and lawfulness for cities and 
individuals. Cities like Sparta, which are especially obedient to the laws, live best in 
peace and become most powerful in war. Lawfulness goes together with concord, 
strength, and happiness (IV.4.15-16). But a strange chicken-and-egg problem becomes 
evident in this passage. It is “established law” everywhere in Greece that citizens “take an 
oath that they will live in concord, and everywhere they take this oath.” But Socrates 
thinks these things come about “so that they should obey the laws.” How can a pre-
existing obedience to the laws create concord, which only then, in turn, creates obedience 
to the laws? 
 This minor problem points to a deeper one. Socrates seems to imply in this 
section that the laws are for the sake of concord, but that concord is for the sake of 
lawfulness. Which is it? In thinking this through, it becomes apparent that Socrates, 
though ostensibly very civically-minded, is making a rather odd defense of lawfulness. 
He is, as he seemed to promise earlier, making a defense of “the laws of a city”—not the 
laws of his city, or even any city in particular, but the laws of a city in the abstract. He is 
praising lawfulness in itself, independent and regardless of the laws’ specific content. 
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This is in fact a quite detached and philosophic defense; it is not the defense of a lawful 
and engaged citizen. But what could possibly be the virtue of lawfulness as such, without 
reference to the content of the laws? The answer would seem to be concord, i.e. like-
mindedness. As long as the citizens are on the same page, it is not so important what page 
they are on. Lawfulness itself creates a homogeneity conducive to peace and good will. 
 But can this be enough? If lawfulness is a mere means to concord, and concord, as 
Socrates here admits, creates nothing high or exalted – not agreement or good taste in 
choruses or music or art (IV.4.16) – but merely peace through a basic (and even vulgar) 
homogeneity of interests and concerns, how can lawfulness itself be exalted? But on the 
other hand, can concord be for the sake of lawfulness as a virtue, as an end in itself? 
Perhaps Socrates’ convoluted depiction of the relation between law and concord is meant 
to mirror a jumble in the minds of ordinary committed citizens. Law (and lawfulness) 
cannot wholly be understood either as a mere means or as an end in itself. If it is 
understood a mere means, for instance to concord, it is not exalted enough to be 
sufficiently respectable.22 But if it is understood as an end in itself, it is not rewarding or 
beneficial enough; in other words, without making reference to the good of the 
community – which is necessarily a good shared and determined by even the lowest 
common denominator – it becomes unclear even to a committed and lawful citizen 
exactly what the benefit of or reason for lawfulness is. 
 Socrates next outlines the benefits of lawfulness for a lawful individual, in the 
form of twelve rhetorical questions. Lawfulness is conducive to winning in law courts, 
                                                
22 It also becomes unclear that lawfulness as a means to the common good (through enforced 
homogeneity) is good for the lawful individual – especially if law or concord unjustly drags down 
the most gifted. Through the lawfulness of individuals, “cities become strongest and happiest” 
(IV.4.16). 
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being trusted, being done good deeds, and acquiring friends and allies, among other 
benefits. Strangely, the central pair of questions, and the final question, mention enemies, 
armistices, allies, and war. But was the focus not supposedly the benefit of lawfulness for 
an individual, within a city? Socrates seems again, by implying that a single city is not a 
unity but a battlefield, to point to the pressing question of regime: if one cannot find a 
foundation for law beyond or above the fiat of whatever particular regime is in power, 
then life even within a single city will remain fundamentally a state of war, a competition 
between different factions attempting to gain power and dictate a set of actions or foist a 
single way of life upon all other citizens. If a higher or more solid foundation for law 
cannot be found, Hippias will be right about the unseriousness of law or lawfulness, but 
perhaps in a deeper sense than he knew. 
 In addition, Socrates’ series of rhetorical questions merely prove that it is usually 
useful to appear lawful, not that it is always good to be lawful. The question of the 




Accordingly, Socrates moves abruptly into a discussion of unwritten laws, which 
turn out to be, according to Hippias, divine laws. This shift is a testament both to 
Socrates’ partial agreement with the school of legal positivism (on a theoretical level) and 
his partial disagreement with it (on a practical and psychological level). Certain laws take 
deep root, even in a scoffer like Hippias. These laws are the same in every city and 
regardless of regime; their legitimacy is thus unquestionable. Because they are “the same 
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in every land,” they must have been divinely established. “For indeed among all human 
beings, the first thing held as law is to revere gods” (IV.4.19). The law to revere gods 
establishes reverence, if not for itself, then for all subsequent divine law (cf. Strauss, On 
the Minos, in The Roots of Political Philosophy 68-70). Unwritten laws include honoring 
one’s parents and avoiding incest (IV.4.20). Hippias objects that this latter law cannot be 
divine, because he sees that some transgress it. Socrates steers him: it is not essential that 
a divine law never be transgressed, but only that its transgressions never go unpunished. 
“Those who transgress the laws laid down by the gods pay a penalty that a human being 
is unable to escape in any way, as some who transgress the laws laid down by human 
beings escape paying the penalty, either by going unnoticed or by using violence” 
(IV.4.21). Enforcement is essential to law. Law in the fullest or most perfect sense must 
be perfectly enforced; only gods can make laws in the fullest sense. Divine or cosmic 
laws are not dependent on regime and are perfectly good for the lawful because they are 
perfectly enforced; a divine foundation for the laws solves both problems implicit in this 
chapter. Just as he previously established piety on natural rather than supernatural 
grounds, Socrates here synthesizes providentially-enforced divine law with the natural 
consequences resulting from forbidden actions such as incest and ingratitude. No 
providential intervention is necessary, because these laws, these absolutely categorical 
prohibitions, “themselves contain the punishments for those who transgress them” 
(IV.4.24). The success of Socrates’ synthesis of divine providence with natural 
consequences, i.e. his synthesis of lawfulness with prudence, i.e. his proof that a belief in 
interventionist gods is unnecessary to healthy family, social, and political life, is evident 
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in his discussion of the natural enforcement of the categorical prohibition of incest 





























Chapter Five restores Euthydemus as Socrates’ interlocutor and presents a variety of 
defenses of continence. Six defenses are offered. Continence is foundational for noble 
action; it is itself noble and grand; it is a means to the good, especially wisdom; it is itself 
the greatest good; it is a means to pleasure; and it is, again, foundational to noble action 
but also a means to the greatest of pleasures. 
 At the chapter’s opening, Socrates is said to have held that “it is good for 
continence to be present in one who intends to do anything noble” (IV.5.1). Most 
obviously, this statement seems to mean that continence is necessary for going through 
with noble action; the noble things are difficult (II.1.28-29). This understanding of 
continence as foundational to virtue parallels Socrates’ earlier exhortation that every man 
ought to believe “that continence is the foundation of virtue” and “be equipped with this 
first in his soul” (I.5.4). Both there and here, continence itself is neither noble nor 
virtuous but foundational, or a means, to nobility and virtue. Continence is “good” or 
among “the things useful for virtue” (IV.5.2); it is not itself virtue. 
 Euthydemus views freedom as a “noble and grand possession” (IV.5.2). The 
reason he views it as noble, according to Socrates, is his assumption that “it belongs to 
one who is free to do what is best” (IV.5.3). For Socrates, then, and perhaps in a way for 
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Euthydemus, freedom is not good or dignified in itself, but only when paired with 
prudence or wisdom. Freedom is only good when it leads to what is good; freedom – and 
perhaps also continence – is a conditional good. But Euthydemus in fact seems to view 
freedom as perfectly, necessarily, and definitionally good, like beauty, strength, riches, 
reputation, and law (IV.2.34, IV.2.14-18). Freedom is noble and grand; the incontinent 
lack freedom altogether; he may well see continence (being the opposite of incontinence, 
and a form of freedom) as noble and grand. Between Socrates’ view that continence is 
useful or foundational to virtue, and Euthydemus’ view that continence as freedom is 
itself noble and grand, a tension develops. It becomes clear that the hodgepodge of 
defenses of continence presented in this chapter may not merely supplement but may in 
fact contradict one another. 
 Socrates next defines continence as a means, not to what is noble but to what is 
good. Only the worst masters would “prevent what is best and compel what is worst” 
(IV.5.5). The incontinent, whose own wild desires are such mad masters, are enslaved in 
the worst slavery. But what is truly best, i.e. the greatest good from which they are 
prevented, turns out not to be noble action but wisdom (IV.5.6). Only because it 
interferes with philosophy is incontinence the worst slavery and, presumably, continence 
useful. And yet continence is not even mentioned here, but rather moderation. 
Moderation, it seems, is foundational for (or a means to) wisdom, the greatest good. But 
if the true opposite of incontinence is now said to be moderation, where does continence 
fall? Is it not even a means to the greatest good (wisdom), but rather a means to a means 
(moderation) to that good? If so, continence has been quickly and drastically devalued. 
Accordingly, Euthydemus’ responses have become correspondingly subdued (IV.5.7). 
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 Socrates attempts to reignite Euthydemus’ enthusiasm for continence by 
convincing him that it is not a means (or a means to a means) to the greatest good, but 
rather itself the greatest good. To do this, he sets up a faulty analogy. The opposite of 
moderation (incontinence) is the cause of the worst things; therefore the opposite of 
incontinence (continence) must be the cause of the best things (IV.5.7-8). Two problems 
emerge here. First, Socrates makes a subtle shift, first claiming that incontinence’s 
opposite is moderation, then claiming it is merely continence. But if continence is in fact 
somewhere between incontinence and moderation in value and dignity, then just because 
moderation leads to great goods, and incontinence to great evils, that does not mean that 
continence (like moderation) will lead to great goods. 
 Second, the analogy is faulty because Socrates assumes that the opposite of a 
thing which leads to a great harm must necessarily lead to a great good. But this is plainly 
false. Even if continence (rather than moderation) were the opposite of incontinence, and 
incontinence led to what is worst, it would not necessarily be true that continence would 
therefore lead to what is best. A regimen of cigarettes and junk food may lead to death, 
but that does not mean that a regimen of no cigarettes and no junk food will lead to 
immortality.23 Socrates here finds it necessary for civic or rhetorical purposes to exalt 
continence unphilosophically; this may point to a necessary gap between the philosophic 
and the political views of continence, or, more generally, between philosophy and 
politics. 
 But this passage in fact points to a deeper problem. In discussing the benefits of 
true moderation, Socrates asks Euthydemus if he thinks “there is anything worse for a 
                                                
23 Though many seem to think it will; perhaps Socrates here uses and thus highlights that 
psychological quirk. 
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human being than what makes one choose the harmful in place of the beneficial and 
persuades one to attend to the former, while neglecting the latter, and compels one to do 
the opposite of what the moderate do?” (IV.5.7). Euthydemus himself answers that he 
thinks there is nothing worse than this. But could not that definition of what is worst, in 
opposition to what is moderate, be applied to noble action itself? If noble action is truly 
self-sacrificial, then moderation and perhaps also continence – far from being 
foundational or a means to noble action – may in fact be opposed to noble action. This 
would bring new meaning to the chapter’s opening statement that Socrates held it “good 
for continence to be present in one who intends to/plans to (µέλλοντι) do anything noble” 
(IV.5.1). According to this argument, if the city or the gods in fact compel one truly to 
sacrifice one’s own good and thus to do what is bad, then they themselves are the “worst 
masters” creating the “worst slavery” (IV.5.5). 
 Accordingly, Socrates tries to shore up Euthydemus’ enthusiasm for conventional 
continence, rather than moderation – but he does so on strange grounds. Continence 
allows one to delay and thus to increase the force of pleasures, preventing both 
oversatiety and underappreciation (IV.5.9). Socrates thus defends continence as a means 
to prudent hedonism. But this defense seems to work too well. Euthydemus is 
enthusiastic (IV.5.9), and Socrates must realize that such a defense, because grounded in 
(and encouraging) hedonism, may unleash too many desires and require too much 
prudence to create a civically healthy mindset. 
 Therefore, Socrates launches his most conventional (and exalted) defense of 
continence yet. Once again he calls it foundational for noble action, but now he blurs its 
status: it may either be a means to noble action, or it may itself entail or provide nobility. 
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Having proven to himself that Euthydemus, though unphilosophic, contains within his 
soul a philosophic impulse (IV.5.7) – which may not be entirely civically healthy – 
Socrates now opens the floodgates of the conventional praise of continence. Now 
continence is associated with nobility, great political power, and the greatest hopes, 
including hopes for the greatest pleasures, to be obtained through noble rule. He even 
induces Euthydemus to think that continence is not merely necessary for these things but 
sufficient: “those who are continent enjoy the benefits that come from these things” 
(IV.5.10). This less philosophic praise of continence becomes necessary because 
Euthydemus is not philosophic and does not appreciate the earlier, and truer, praise of 
continence as necessary for the pursuit of wisdom. Continence must again be exalted, 
tethered to nobility and great hopes, in order to be attractive enough for healthy political 
life; it must itself be seen as noble and virtuous, not as merely a means (cf. Laws 626e). 
Through this experiment, Socrates once again shows, simultaneously, the necessary gap 
between philosophy and politics, and the (therefore dangerous) philosophic impulse 
















Xenophon begins Chapter Six by saying that he will now “attempt to tell also how 
[Socrates] also made his companions more skilled at conversing” (4.6.1). At the end of 
the previous chapter, Xenophon had mentioned the activity of separating out, through 
collective deliberation, “the matters of practical concern (τά πράγµατα) according to class” 
– which Socrates held to be good for all men (IV.5.12). But now the focus shifts toward 
examining “what each of the beings (τό ὄντα) is” – which Socrates himself never stopped 
doing with his companions (IV.6.1). We seem to be moving into more strictly 
philosophic territory; if there is in fact a tension between philosophy and politics, rhetoric 
may become even more necessary. 
 Accordingly, Xenophon feigns laziness to excuse himself from “go[ing] through 
all things as [Socrates] defined them;” that would be a lot of work! (IV.6.1). But he will 
tell some in which “his manner of examination,” if not the implications of his 
examination, will be clear. 
 This chapter as a whole may be divided into four sections. The first three sections 
are a single conversation with Euthydemus: first, a discussion of piety, nobility, justice, 
and wisdom (IV.6.2-7); centrally, a discussion of the good and the noble (8-9); and third, 
a discussion of courage (10-11). A short narrative section then describes the way Socrates 
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defined different types of rule (12). A final narrative section, which includes an 
embedded dialogue with an unnamed interlocutor, describes Socrates’ manner of 
teaching or speaking (13-15). 
It becomes apparent that the plan of this chapter was in fact revealed by 
Xenophon’s list of ‘What is?’ questions in Chapter One of Book I. After describing 
Socrates’ chastisement of those who investigate the divine things, Xenophon wrote: 
“These, then, are the sorts of things he said  concerning those who involved themselves in 
such matters. But he himself was always conversing about human things—examining 
what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is shameful, what is just, what is 
unjust, what is moderation, what is madness, what is courage, what is cowardice, what is 
a city, what is a statesman, what is rule over human beings, what is a skilled ruler over 
human beings, as well as about the other things…” (I.1.16). This chapter follows the 
order of topics set forth in that list; the few deviations from that plan, and the 
implications of those deviations, must be investigated as they arise. 
 
Piety, Nobility, and Justice 
 
 First, Xenophon’s Socrates investigates piety. This question is somehow primary 
or even foundational; it takes precedence over – for it may affect – the investigation into 
all others. 
Socrates begins by asking Euthydemus what sort of thing piety is, skipping its 
definition. Euthydemus responds that piety is “the noblest sort, by Zeus” (IV.6.2).24 
                                                
24 Freedom, he had said earlier, was a possession “as noble and grand as can be” (IV.5.2). 
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Again skirting the definition of piety itself, Socrates asks if Euthydemus is able to say 
“what sort of person the pious one is.” Euthydemus responds that the pious person is “one 
who honors the gods.” Socrates asks him if there is a certain way one should honor the 
gods to be considered pious; Euthydemus explains that one must honor the gods lawfully. 
Euthydemus then agrees that if one knows the laws, one knows how one should 
honor the gods (IV.6.3). Implicit in this agreement – that what the laws prescribe is what 
one should do – is the idea that law, to deserve the name law, must be good. Goodness, in 
other words, is an essential or definitional trait of law. Many times throughout the 
Memorabilia, Socrates has called attention to a striking linguistic, or rather 
psychological, phenomenon. Certain words have goodness as a definitional attribute. 
Work (I.2.57), leisure (III.10.9), feasting (III.14.7), wealth (IV.2.37, cf. Republic 559c), 
and freedom (IV.5.3) were shown to be words of this kind. The fact that these words had 
goodness as a definitional attribute enabled Socrates, in several cases, to redefine them in 
accordance with what is actually good. For instance, with feasting, “he said also that ‘to 
feast’ (εὐωχεῖσθαι) was called eating (ἐσθίειν) in the Athenian tongue. He said that the 
‘well’ (εὖ) was added with a view to eating those things that pain neither the soul nor the 
body and are not difficult to find. As a result he attributed feasting, too, to those who live 
with a moderate/orderly way of life” (III.14.7). In other words, if feasting in the 
conventional and opulent sense is not in fact good, true feasting must mean something 
more minimal; the goodness is more essential than the opulence. By using the goodness 
inherent within the concept of feasting, Socrates was able to twist it away from its normal 
meaning and toward something much more moderate. Goodness may in fact be more 
essential to certain words’ definitions than any other aspect of them. 
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Law, according to Euthydemus, seems to be a word with goodness as a 
definitional trait. A law which advises one to do what one should not in fact do, or what 
is not in fact good, is not truly a law (cf. I.2.42 and Greater Hippias 284d-e). 
Because law is good, if one knows the laws regarding honoring the gods, one 
knows how one should honor the gods. Next, Socrates gains Euthydemus’ assent that one 
who knows how one should honor the gods thinks that one should honor the gods in this 
way. Having established that solid link between knowing something to be good and 
thinking it to be good, Socrates asks whether anyone honors gods “in a way other than as 
he thinks one should?” Euthydemus does not think so. Two steps are taken here; Socrates 
makes a solid link between thinking that one should honor the gods in the way the laws 
prescribe, and doing such honoring oneself. In other words, he moves from thought to 
action, establishing a solid link between thinking something is good and attempting to do 
that thing. Simultaneously, he moves from the general to the personal, establishing a solid 
and syllogistic link between thinking something is good in the abstract, or for all human 
beings, and thinking it good for oneself. 
Having established solid links between knowing what is lawful, knowing one 
should do what is lawful, thinking one should do what is lawful, and personally doing 
what is lawful, Socrates connects the first item to the last: the knower of what is lawful 
will do what is lawful, i.e. he will honor the gods lawfully (IV.6.4). Euthydemus 
emphatically agrees. Socrates then re-establishes the originally agreed-upon links 
between honoring the gods lawfully and honoring as one should, and between honoring 
as one should and being pious. If those three items are effectively equivalent, and 
knowing what is lawful is equivalent to (or necessarily leads to) honoring the gods 
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lawfully, then all that remains is for Socrates to connect the entire chain, whose links 
have all been forged: “then the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would 
correctly be defined by us as pious” (IV.6.4). Euthydemus agrees. But if knowing what is 
lawful concerning the gods is equivalent to being pious, how can knowing (and thus 
culpable) impiety exist? If piety is knowledge, how is impiety deservedly punished? 
Accordingly (ἆρα), Socrates immediately asks, moving into a discussion of 
nobility and justice, “is it permitted to deal with human beings in any manner someone 
may wish?” (IV.6.5). Euthydemus denies this. He himself applies their formula regarding 
the pious to those who are lawful with human beings: “also regarding these, the one who 
knows what is lawful—in accordance with which people should deal with one another—
would be lawful” (IV.6.5). He agrees that lawfulness is equivalent to knowledge. The 
unphilosophic Euthydemus has again tested positive for an inclination to accept the 
philosophic outlook.  
Socrates asks whether those who deal with one another lawfully, deal with one 
another as one should. Because law is definitionally good, Euthydemus agrees. 
“Accordingly,” Socrates asks, “do those who deal with human beings as one should, deal 
with them nobly?” Euthydemus emphatically agrees. Not only the lawful but the noble, it 
seems, is good or choiceworthy by definition. The noble is in its very essence something 
which one ought to do. Socrates next asks, “Do those who deal with human beings nobly 
engage nobly in human affairs?” Euthydemus, perhaps less committed to entering politics 
by the time of this conversation, merely says that this is “plausible.” 
Here Socrates makes a surprising shift. He does not, as he did with the pious, 
connect all the links of his argument. One would expect him to connect the knowledge of 
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what is lawful regarding human beings to the noble engagement in human affairs, thus 
solidifying and demonstrating the links between these things. Instead, he shifts to a 
discussion of justice. Perhaps this shift indicates that, according to the philosophic 
perspective, knowing what is lawful regarding human beings is not in fact equivalent to 
political engagement because wisdom does not point to political activity (cf. Republic 
347c). Or, perhaps Socrates moves quickly from the noble to the just because he sees the 
just as more fundamental; perhaps the noble receives its character from what is politically 
just. 
“Those who are obedient to the laws” do what is just, according to Socrates and 
then Euthydemus, who adds that the things called just are “the things that the laws bid.” 
He may have learned this from Socrates’ conversation with Hippias in Chapter Four. One 
who does what the laws bid does “both what is just and what one should” (IV.6.6). 
A slight terminological shift has occurred in this section on justice. In discussing 
the pious and the noble, Socrates had spoken of being lawful (νοµίµως, νόµιµα: IV.6.4-5). But 
upon transitioning to justice, he begins to speak of obeying the laws (τοῖς νόµοις πειθόµενοι: 
IV.6.5). This is perhaps indicative of a shift away from the unwritten laws and toward the 
political laws. But this would imply that nobility, which in fact retains the language of 
piety and unwritten law, has something in common not only with justice but with piety. 
By sandwiching the noble between the pious and the just, as a kind of transitional 
concept, Socrates perhaps indicates that nobility is in a sense halfway between piety and 
justice, or receives its character from each. The noble man understands himself to be 
acting neither simply for political reasons nor simply for the gods – yet his desire for the 
noble may spring from both justice and piety, and may retain its roots in each. He may 
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attempt to carry out an action which can be exalted without explicit reference to gods or 
human beings, or to the good of any particular being. By making the discussion of the 
noble transitional and very brief, Xenophon would seem to indicate that the noble is not 
foundational, but rather a vaguer synthesis of – or superstructure built upon, yet never 
quite transcending – the just and the pious. The noble would be, in a way, a pinnacle, 
whose vagueness might in certain settings render it more durable than either of its roots. 
Socrates next applies the argument about piety as lawfulness to justice. Strikingly, 
both the just and the pious (from which the noble emerges) seem to be subsets of the 
broader concept of lawfulness. Lawfulness, then, is foundational: piety is lawfulness in 
interactions with the gods, whereas justice is lawfulness in interactions with other human 
beings. Applying his earlier method now to justice, Socrates forms solid links between 
knowing one should be lawful and thinking one should be lawful, and between thinking 
one should be lawful and doing what is lawful. To know the lawful is to do what is just; 
the doers of justice are just; the just are defined as the knowers of what is lawful (IV.6.6). 
If piety, nobility, and justice are all subsets of lawfulness, all three will display the 
theoretical tension within law. Law is, in its essence, both deservedly punitive and good 
for the lawful. Because lawfulness is good for the lawful, all knowers of the law will be 
lawful. Those who are not lawful could not have been knowers of the law. Thus they 
could not have been culpable. Thus law cannot reasonably be deservedly punitive. 
Because piety, nobility, and justice have come to be equated with knowledge, 
Socrates next turns to wisdom. He establishes that the wise are wise due to 
understanding, and that understanding/scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) is wisdom (IV.6.7). 
An understanding attained through revelation is not mentioned here. But Socrates has a 
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message of moderation for the philosophic or scientific as well, given that human beings 
“may not be able to understand all of the beings” (IV.6.7). 
 
The Good  
 
Socrates next leads Euthydemus to grant that the same thing is not beneficial for 
all; “what is beneficial to one is sometimes harmful to another” (IV.6.8, cf. Statesman 
294b). Law, however, is in its essence both good in every case and general. If 
Euthydemus believes that what is general cannot in every case be good, he holds the 
impious position that law is not a being. Or, he holds that although law is not knowable 
(or intelligibly good) it is still noble to obey law, despite or even because of that 
unknowability. Law may be unknowable or bad for us, yet it must be followed. Perhaps 
this is why Socrates mentioned that knowing what the laws bid is essential to obeying the 
laws in the section on justice, but not in the section on piety (IV.6.6, cf. I.2.41). Law 
would then be noble for all, though of unknowable goodness in particular cases or for 
particular human beings. 
We are surprised to discover that Xenophon here seems to deviate from the plan 
of topics outlined in Book I. Instead of discussing moderation and madness, he discusses 
the good and the noble. With that substitution in mind, Socrates next obtains 
Euthydemus’ enthusiastic endorsement of the claim that a thing cannot be “noble for 
everything.” For a thing to be noble, according to Euthydemus, it must be beneficial or 





Euthydemus holds that courage is “very noble indeed” (IV.6.10). Because the 
noble has now been associated or equated with the useful (IV.6.9), Euthydemus agrees 
that courage, if noble, is also useful. It is not his opinion that it is useful to be ignorant of 
“the terrible and risky things” (IV.6.10). Whose use, and whose ignorance, are left 
unclear. Might not the city at times find even ignorance in the citizens useful, and label 
that courage? But Euthydemus denies that ignorance can be courage. Neither can a fear 
of “things that are not terrible” (IV.6.10, cf. Laws 646e-647a and Aristotle Nicomachean 
Ethics 1115a8-11 on fear and shame). 
 Those who are good regarding the terrible and risky things are courageous 
(IV.6.10). Socrates does not yet clarify whose good is at issue. Those who are good 
regarding such things necessarily deal with them nobly. Those who deal with them badly 
are bad (IV.6.11). Surprisingly, Socrates does mention those who deal with such things 
shamefully. 
Socrates next forges solid links between knowledge and the virtue of courage. 
Because courage is a “very noble” thing, and nobility is a subset or emanation of (piety 
and) justice, which in turn are subsets of lawfulness, courage is susceptible to the same 
method as were the other lawful things. Those who think something ought to be done, do 
that thing. Those unable to do what is courageous must have lacked knowledge of how to 
deal with the terrible and risky things. Euthydemus is hesitant to agree with that claim 
(IV.6.11); the Socratic interpretation of courage, it seems, is more difficult to accept than 
the Socratic interpretation of justice, nobility, and piety (cf. Protagoras 360d). But 
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Euthydemus agrees that only those with knowledge of how to deal with the terrible things 
will be able to deal with them as one should (IV.6.11). He also agrees that those who are 
not mistaken will do well, and finally – becoming more confident – that those who are 
cowardly are mistaken. Socrates summarizes: “Those who understand how nobly to deal 
with the terrible and risky things are courageous, then, and those who are mistaken about 
this are cowardly.” Euthydemus responds: “They are, at least in my opinion” (IV.6.11). 
The philosophic investigation of lawfulness and its subsets, then, discovers a 
closed chain of necessity between knowledge, thought, action, and being — that is, 
between knowledge about what is good, thoughts about what is good, actions emerging 
from those opinions, and one’s essence or virtue. If there are solid links between each of 
these items, then virtue is knowledge and retributive punishment irrational. Whether 
political virtue can truly be understood in these terms remains an open question. But 
Socrates discovered, even in an average youth who held freedom to be the noblest and 
grandest possession (IV.5.3), an inclination to accept the philosophic perspective. 
 
The Re-embrace of Law 
 
Precisely because of that discovery, Xenophon immediately ends the depiction of 
Socrates’ conversation with Euthydemus and abruptly explains the Socratic re-embrace 
of law and lawful rule. All theoretical qualms disappear. At a practical level, it is 
important that kingship and tyranny be differentiated (IV.6.12, cf. Statesman 301c). Now 
there is no mention of the idea that the ruling virtue, or knowledge, would be the only 
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legitimate claim to rule. The re-embrace of the lawful in fact means that, at least on a 
political level, virtue cannot be understood as knowledge. 
After proving to himself that the unphilosophic soul of Euthydemus has a natural 
inclination toward accepting the philosophic outlook, then, Socrates re-embraces 
lawfulness. It is precisely the fact that “all men by nature desire to know” (Aris. 
Metaphysics 980c) – paired with the necessary gap between philosophy and healthy 
political life – that makes law and lawfulness so necessary. The ancients’ preference for 
reverence, as opposed to the moderns’ preference for enlightenment, may paradoxically 
be explained by the ancients’ greater emphasis on the natural ubiquity of the desire to 
know. 
Deviating again from his plan of topics, Xenophon does not discuss “what is a 
city, what is a statesman.” Instead, he skips to a discussion of “what is rule over human 
beings.” For the promised discussion of “what is a skilled ruler over human beings,” he 
substitutes a discussion of Socrates’ own method of teaching and speaking. Socrates 
employed rhetoric carefully, in order to draw the half-philosophic yet confused back 
toward a civically healthy mindset that emphasizes deeds, work, war, and concord 
(IV.6.13-14), and in order to “lead his arguments through the opinions of human beings” 
(IV.6.15). It seems that Socrates himself, and perhaps no other man, is Xenophon’s 










Conclusion: Religion and Politics Through Socrates’ Eyes 
 
“Don’t you see that the most ancient and the wisest of human things—cities and 
nations—are the most pious toward the gods, and that the most sensible ages in 
life are the most attentive to the gods?” (I.4.16) 
 
 
Books III and IV of the Memorabilia show us that and how, according to Xenophon’s 
Socrates, politics is fundamentally religious, and religion fundamentally political. Politics 
is fundamentally religious in that it must lean upon an exalted vision of the fatherland to 
encourage just rule and loyal sacrifice, as well as upon providential gods to support 
lawfulness in each of its forms, including the form of courage. The basic grounding 
norms of healthy family and social life, and respect for lawfulness itself, are rendered far 
more stable when enforced not merely by a given regime but rather at a trans-political 
level. To combine robustness and vitality in the citizenry, on the one hand, with stable 
and peaceful family and political life—to walk the political tightrope between confidence 
and fear—requires, according to the Socratic understanding, providential gods and the 
hopes they render reasonable. A fearful or dispirited citizenry is unhealthy, whereas a 
lawlessly confident citizenry may require despotic political control to restrain. Unwritten 
or divine laws, once internalized, may feel far less oppressive. We are inclined, by nature, 
to be lawful beings. 
 Religion, on the other hand, is fundamentally political, according to Socrates, 
because piety has its root in the broader concept of lawfulness, which is itself political 
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and contains the virtue of justice. The gods are not only political lawgivers but, if 
understood to be providential rulers, may be implicated in the theoretical and practical 
problems of human rule. If so, Xenophon’s typology of rule, as presented in Book III, 
might have implications beyond the human realm. It may, in other words, have 
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